The Causation Issue in Workers\u27Compensation Mental Disability Cases: An Analysis, Solutions, and a Perspective by Joseph, Lawrence
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Volume 36 
Issue 2 Issue 2 - March 1983 Article 2 
3-1983 
The Causation Issue in Workers'Compensation Mental Disability 
Cases: An Analysis, Solutions, and a Perspective 
Lawrence Joseph 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lawrence Joseph, The Causation Issue in Workers'Compensation Mental Disability Cases: An Analysis, 
Solutions, and a Perspective, 36 Vanderbilt Law Review 263 (1983) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol36/iss2/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, 
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
The Causation Issue in Workers'
Compensation Mental Disability
Cases: An Analysis, Solutions, and
a Perspective
Lawrence Joseph*
Cases under workers' compensation systems that concern mental dis-
abilities present special problems in the determination of causation. In
this Article Mr. Joseph argues that the complexities inherent in a deci-
sion whether a mental disability has arisen out of employment force ad-
ministrative agencies and courts in these cases to engage in normative
evaluative inquiries. These inquiries, according to Mr. Joseph, result in
findings that potentially frustrate the underlying compromise policy of
workers' compensation systems; these evaluative decisions create classes
of claimants that may be under or overinclusive. Mr. Joseph describes
several possible solutions to this problem and concludes by reviewing
Professor Burton's proposal of a "Worker's Disease Protection Act." This
Act would allow recovery for disabilities of unknown etiology regardless
of causation and, Mr. Joseph argues, is a systemic solution that deserves
serious consideration.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The causal relation between employment and a disabling mental
or emotional injury1 presents one of the most complex issues in acci-
dental injury and workers' compensation law.2 Resolution of the issue
1. This Article contains several interchangeable terms-"psychological," "emotional,"
"nervous," and "mental"-that describe the kind of injuries which the Article addresses. Al-
though a mental injury-as opposed to a physical injury-is extremely difficult to define for
medical or legal purposes, this Article utilizes the distinction between mental and physical inju-
ries for two reasons. First, the distinction is analytically convenient. Second, in workers' com-
pensation cases jurisdictional concerns require the distinction. For a discussion of the relevance
of the distinction between a physical and mental injury to the issue of causation in workers'
injury cases, see infra notes 102, 233-34, & 246 and accompanying text.
2. Legal literature largely has ignored the difficult technical and policy problems inherent
in the determination of causation in mental injury cases. A 1961 law review comment on work
related mental disorders, however, contains a superb analysis of the causation issue. Comment,
Workmen's Compensation Awards for Psychoneurotic Reactions, 70 YALE L.J. 1129, 1138-45
(1961) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Workmen's Compensation Awards]. Although this Com-
ment preceded the important state supreme court mental disability opinions of the 1960's and
1970's, see infra notes 113-88 and accompanying text, it still retains enormous analytical value.
Professor Larson briefly discusses the causation issue in his treatise. See 1B A. LARSON, THE
LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 42.23 (1982). Professors Malone and Small also have al-
luded implicitly to the issue in articles on factual causation. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-
Fact, 9 STAN. L. REv. 60 (1956); Small, Gaffing At a Thing Called Cause: Medico-Legal Con-
fiicts in the Concept of Causation, 31 TEx. L. REv. 630 (1953). The author has analyzed the
causation issue in relation to Michigan's unique judicial and legislative experience with work-
ers' compensation. Joseph, Causation in Workers' Compensation Mental Disability Cases: The
Michigan Experience, 27 WAYNE L. REv. 1079 (1981). For a discussion of the leading cases in
Michigan, see infra notes 171-88 and accompanying text.
Professor Larson has written the generally acknowledged leading article on mental disabili-
ties. Larson, Mental and Nervous Injury in Workmen's Compensation, 23 VAND. L. REV. 1243
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Mental and Nervous Injury]; see 1B A. LARSON, supra, §§ 42.20-24.
Professor Larson's article, however, does not address directly the causation issue. Rather, the
article examines whether mental injuries satisfy the "personal injury" requirement of compen-
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requires at least an elementary appreciation of psychiatric principles
and an understanding of the causes of mental disorders; consequently
the issue has an interdisciplinary dimension. In addition, the issue is
technically complex. A workers' compensation system is the acciden-
tal injury law system that deals with injuries which relate to employ-
ment. A legislatively defined "coverage formula"-the "personal in-
jury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment"
requirement 3-and the legislative objectives that underlie the
sation statutes. For a discussion of the personal injury requirement and its technical relation to
mental disabilities, see infra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
The topic of work related mental disorders has attracted extensive commentary. See P.
BARTH, WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND WORK-RELATED ILLNESSES AND DISEASES 80-83 (1980); 13
W. MALONE & H. JOHNSON, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW AND
PRACTICE § 235 (2d ed. 1980); W. MALONE, M. PLANT, & J. LITTLE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS 260-67 (2d ed. 1980); NATIONAL COMM'N ON
STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS, COMPENDIUM ON WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 199-200
(1973) [hereinafter cited as COMPENDIUM]; M. SHAPO, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS AND COM-
PENSATION LAW 14-40 (1976); Brill, Compensation for Psychiatric Disorders, in COMPENSATION
IN PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITY AND REHABILITATION 300 (J. Leedy ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as
Brill]; Brill & Glass, Workmen's Compensation for Psychiatric Disorders, 193 J. A.M.A. 345
(1965); Fleming, Industry Looks at the Emotionally Troubled Employee, in THE EMOTIONALLY
TROUBLED EMPLOYEE: A CHALLENGE TO INDUSTRY 57 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Fleming];
Lesser & Kiev, Psychiatric Disability and Workmen's Compensation, in MENTAL HEALTH AND
WORK ORGANIZATION 237 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Lesser & Kiev]; Levine, Legal Questions
Regarding the Causation of Occupational Disease, 26 LAB. L.J. 88, 104-06 (1975); Loria, The
Mind is the Matter, 53 J. UREB. L. 895 (1976); Manson, Workmen's Compensation and Disa-
bling Neurosis, 11 BUFFALO L. REV. 376 (1962); McLean, The Psychiatrist Looks At the Emo-
tionally Troubled Employee, in THE EMOTIONALLY TROUBLED EMPLOYEE: A CHALLENGE TO IN-
DUSTRY 3 (1976) [hereinafter cited as McLean]; Render, Mental Illness as an Industrial
Accident, 31 TENN. L. REV. 288 (1964); Robitscher, Mental Suffering and Traumatic Neurosis,
in COMPENSATION IN PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITY AND REHABILITATION 218 (J. Leedy ed. 1971) [here-
inafter cited as Robitscher]; Seizer, Psychological Stress and Legal Concepts of Disease Causa-
tion, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 951, 954-56, 961 (1971); Smith & Solomon, Traumatic Neurosis in
Court, 30 VA. L. REV. 87, 138-49 (1943); Spenser, The Developing Notion of Employer Respon-
sibility for the Alcoholic, Drug-Addicted or Mentally Ill Employee: An Examination Under
Federal and State Employment Statutes and Arbitration Decisions, 53 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 659,
711-18 (1979); Trice & Roman, Occupational Risk Factors in Mental Health and the Impact
Role Change Experience, in COMPENSATION IN PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITY AND REHABILITATION 145
(J. Leedy ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Trice & Roman]; Note, When Stress Becomes Distress:
Mental Disabilities Under Workers' Compensation In Massachusetts, 15 NEW ENG. L. REV.
287 (1980); Note, Nervous Disabilities Induced by Repetitious Mental Trauma Held Noncom-
pensable: Transportation Insurance Co. v. Maksyn, 33 Sw. L.J. 905 (1979); Comment, Recovery
for Nervous Injury Resulting from Mental Stimulus Under Workmen's Compensation Laws,
53 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 731 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Recovery for Nervous Injury];
Comment, Workmen's Compensation-Compensability of Mental Injury-In re Wolfe v. Sib-
ley, Lindsay, & Curr Co., 21 N.Y.L.F. 465 (1976); Comment, The Compensability of Mentally
Induced Occupational Diseases Under Texas Workers' Compensation Laws, 10 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 148 [hereinafter cited as Comment, Texas Workers' Compensation Law]; Rice, Can Com-
panies Kill?, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, June 1981, at 78; Lubin, On-the-Job Stress Leads Many
Workers to File-and Win-Compensation Awards, Wall St. J., Sept. 17, 1980, at 33, col. 4.
3. This statement of the coverage formula incorporates the language of the majority of
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formula restrict judicial interpretations in causation inquiries.4 Fur-
thermore, in most workers' compensation systems, administrative,
not judicial bodies, make initial legal and factual determinations.
This structure creates technical problems. 5 Because one cannot objec-
tively prove the cause of mental disorders,6 administrative triers
must make evaluative decisions that potentially conflict with the pol-
icy directives of the workers' compensation system. Appellate courts,
then, must make evaluative decisions about causation, which judges
frame as questions concerning sufficiency of the evidence.7
The adjudicative process for mental injuries in workers' compen-
sation cases differs radically from the determination whether to im-
pose liability for emotional injury under the common-law tort sys-
tem.' In tort actions concerning mental injury, courts have addressed
state statutes. 4 A. LARSON, supra note 2, app. A, table 1 (1980). The source of this and similar
language is the British Compensation Act. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 6.10. A minority of
states have enacted substantive variations of the formula. 4 A. LARSON, supra note 2, app. A,
table 1. These statutory variations, however, have not substantively affected the compensability
of mental injuries. 1B A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 37.10.
4. See infra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 65-69 & 96-100 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 45, 51, & 57 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 202-05 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 39-57 and accompanying text. The literature exploring the problems of
allocating loss for mental injury under the tort system is extensive and impressive. The earliest
articles on the subject have become classics. See Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal
Damage, 20 MICH. L. REV. 497 (1922); Green, "Fright" Cases, 27 ILL. L. REV. 761 (1933);
Harper & McNeely, A Re-examination of the Basis for Liability for Emotional Distress, 1938
Wis. L. REV. 426; Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV.
L. REV. 1033 (1936) [hereinafter cited as Magruder]. Two articles in the 1940's still remain vital
sources of analysis. See Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for
Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REV. 193 (1944) [hereinafter cited as Relation of Emotions to Injury
and Disease]; Smith & Solomon, supra note 2. The treatise writers also have addressed the
subject comprehensively. See 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 9.1-.3 (1956 &
Supp. 1968); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra, § 18.4; W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS §§ 12, 54 (4th ed. 1971).
For analyses of the causation issues that arise in mental injury tort actions, see Selzer,
supra note 2; Smith, Problems of Proof in Psychic Injury Cases, 14 SYRACUSE L. REV. 586
(1963) [hereinafter cited as Problems of Proof]; Note, Causation in Disease: Quantum of Proof
Required to Reach the Jury, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 793 (1959).
For analyses of the broad spectrum of legal and medical problems that occur in mental
injury actions, see F. BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS 252 (1956); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS, §§ 46, 48, 312, 313, 436, 436a (1965); Averbach, Causation: A Medico-Legal Battle-
field, 6 CLEv.-MAR. L. REV. 209 (1957); Bohlen & Polikoff, Liability in New York for the Physi-
cal Consequences of Emotional Disturbances, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 409 (1932); Brody, Negli-
gently Inflicted Psychic Injuries: A Return to Reason, 7 VILL. L. REV. 232 (1962); Cantor,
Psychosomatic Injury, Traumatic Psychoneurosis, and Law, 6 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 428 (1957);
Goodhart, The Shock Cases and Area of Risk, 16 MoD. L. REV. 14 (1953); Peck, Compensation
for Pain: A Reappraisal in Light of New Medical Evidence, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1355, 1386-95
(1974); Rendall, Nervous Shock and Tortious Liability, 2 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 291 (1961); Coin-
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their inability to prove objectively mental disorders by adopting judi-
cial standards that are applicable within the respective policy do-
mains of the judge and the jury.9 The cause-in-fact inquiry in mental
injury tort actions, which is an evaluative decision because of the ab-
sence of objective proof, also occurs within the judge-jury decision-
making process. 10 This process, which is the same as other common-
law policy based decisions, creates no policy conflict.1 The different
decisionmaking processes that exist within the workers' compensa-
tion system and the tort system, therefore, raise difficult jurispruden-
tial questions: whether workers' compensation systems or the tort
system should administer economic allocations for injuries such as
mental disorders that cannot be linked objectively to an employee's
work; and whether the judiciary or the legislature should choose the
appropriate system.
1 2
Another source of the complexity in workers' compensation
mental disability cases lies in the potentially far-reaching social and
economic consequences of any resolution of the causation issue. Com-
mentators estimate that between fifteen and thirty percent of the
general population suffers impaired efficiency because of mental
problems.13 Furthermore, no one disputes that an employee's work
environment significantly affects his psychological well-being. 4 A res-
olution of the causation issue thus raises important and difficult dis-
tributive considerations.
15
ment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress: The Case for an Independent Tort, 59 GEo. L.J.
1237 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress]; Comment,
Negligence and the Infliction of Emotional Harm: A Reappraisal of the Nervous Shock Cases,
35 U. Cm. L. REv. 512 (1968).
9. See infra notes 45, 47, 51, & 57 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 46-57 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
12. Professor Keeton has analyzed comprehensively the intricate processes of reform of
accidental injury loss-shifting policies. See R. KEETON, VENTURING To Do JUSTICE REFORMING
PRIVATE LAW (1969). In addition, Professor O'Connell and Dean Henderson have raised impor-
tant and probing questions about the systemic nature of these reforms. See J. O'CONNELL & R.
HENDERSON, TORT LAW: No-FAULT AND BEYOND 581-808 (1975). Professors Barth and Burton,
and Dean Henderson have made three of the few attempts to confront directly the question of
compensation for alleged work related injuries with unknown etiologies. BARTH, supra note 2, at
278-79; Henderson, Should Workmen's Compensation Be Extended to Non-occupational Inju-
ries?, 48 TEx. L. REv. 117 (1969); Burton, The Challenge of Diseases for Workers' Compensa-
tion (October 7, 1981) (unpublished manuscript) (copy on file at offices of Vanderbilt Law Re-
view). See infra notes 247-55 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Fleming, supra note 2, at 57.
14. See McLean, supra note 2, at 3.
15. The "distributive considerations" that this Article refers to are the interrelated policy
bases-whether moral, economic, or social-that the legislature or a court considers when de-
ciding on the allocation of the costs of work related mental injuries through the adoption of a
1983]
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The first purpose of this Article is to explore comprehensively
the technical and policy dimensions of the causation issue in workers'
compensation mental disability cases.16 To achieve-this purpose, part
II of the Article analyzes the nature of mental disorders. Part III dis-
cusses the substantive approaches to mental disorders under tort law.
Part IV examines in detail the structure and purpose of workers'
compensation systems and explores the systems' technical and policy
dimensions. This part then discusses the approaches that courts have
taken when confronted with the causation issue in mental disability
cases. Part V of the Article criticizes the judicial approaches and
their underlying policy bases.
The second purpose of this Article is to clarify the distributive
and jurisprudential considerations that courts and legislatures inevi-
tably confront in their attempts to resolve the mental disability issue.
Consequently, part VI of the Article presents judicial and legislative
solutions to this problem. This part then classifies and discusses the
distributive and jurisprudential ramifications of each of these
solutions.
A third, more general purpose of the Article is to provide a
method of technical and policy analysis that applies not only to
mental disabilities, but also to other disabling diseases of unknown
etiology, including cardiovascular and back related disabilities. These
disabling diseases contain essentially the same kind of technical, p01-
particular causation formula. For an analysis of the policy bases of causation inquiries in work
related mental injury actions, see infra notes 189-214 and accompanying text. For a discussion
of the distributive ramifications of various proposed solutions to the mental disability causation
issue, see infra notes 231-32 & 236 and accompanying text.
An impressive body of literature has addressed the difficult distributive questions that
arise in allocating the costs of personal injuries-including but not limited to emotional inju-
ries. See G. CALEBRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970); Calebresi, Optimal Deterrence and
Accidents, 84 YALE L.J. 656 (1975); Calebresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the
Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Calebresi, Risk Distribution];
Calebresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Tort, 81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972);
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960); Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liabil-
ity, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973); Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARv. L.
REv. 537 (1972); James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance,
57 YALE L.J. 549 (1948); Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 205 (1973).
16. For purposes of analysis, this Article assumes that claimants alleging employment re-
lated mental disorders have been disabled. The Article does not discuss the technical issues
that surround the determination whether a mental injury has disabled a claimant. For a general
discussion of the disability concept under workers' compensation acts, see infra note 64 and
accompanying text. For an analysis of the problems relating to the disability issue and mental
injuries, see Lerner, Evaluation of Disability Resulting From Psychiatric Conditions, in CoM-
PENSATION IN PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITY AND REHABILITATION 47 (J. Leedy ed. 1971); Lesser & Kiev,




icy, administrative, and medical causation issues as do mental disa-
bilities. Accordingly, the same technical, distributive, and jurispru-
dential methods of analyses that the Article applies to mental
disabilities are applicable, by analogy, to these other diseases.
The broad based methodology of this Article provides a founda-
tion for the final perspective. The Article concludes that a legisla-
tively created compensation system designed and structured to deal
specifically with most of the technical and policy considerations in
mental disability cases and cases that concern disabling diseases of
unknown etiology might best resolve these difficult problems. Part
VII outlines the structure as well as the advantages and disadvan-
tages of this proposed system.
II. THE NATURE OF MENTAL DISORDERS
Medical science has identified a broad spectrum of mental disor-
ders.17 The professional diagnostic nomenclature that attempts clini-
cally to characterize mental conditions correspondingly includes dif-
ferent categories of mental disorders. 8 These categories range from
mental conditions that result from structural impairment of brain
tissue19 to psychotic20 and neurotic2' conditions and personality dis-
17. In one view of psychodynamic theory, mental illnesses comprise a continuous spec-
trum that ranges from normal behavior and balanced emotional homeostasis to the most ad-
vanced degrees of mental and nervous disorders. Smith, Problems of Proof, supra note 8, at
616. For a discussion contra, see D. MECHANIC, MENTAL HEALTH AND SOCIAL POLICY 18 (1969);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment j (1965).
18. The primary source for standard psychiatric diagnosis and nomenclature is the AMER-
ICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (3d
ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as DSM-III]. DSM-III defines mental disorders by comprehensively
describing their manifestations. Regarding the predecessor DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MAN-
UAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (2d ed. 1968), or DSM-II, Professor Brooks accurately has observed:
Not all psychiatrists accept the diagnoses [of DSM-II]. Much of this disagreement is
of a principled character. Indeed, [DMS-IL] itself sometimes acknowledges the controver-
siality of a position taken there .... Psychiatry is a volatile discipline and within the
psychiatric profession there is a considerable extent of skepticism as to the usefulness of
the nosological or diagnostic system .... First, the illnesses listed . . . are not clearly
defined. They have no clear-cut symptomatology and they frequently overlap.... Sec-
ond, it is difficult for a psychiatrist to make an accurate diagnosis while the client is in a
state of special stress caused by the behavior that has brought him into the legal system.
A. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 26-28 (1974 & Supp. 1980).
19. DSM-III begins by describing generally the broad category of Organic Mental Disor-
ders: "The essential feature of all these disorders is a psychological or behavioral abnormality
associated with transient or permanent dysfunction of the brain." DSM-III, supra note 18, at
101. It then adds:
Differentiation of Organic Mental Disorders as a separate class does not imply that
nonorganic ("functional") mental disorders are somehow independent of brain processes.
On the contrary, it is assumed that all psychological processes, normal and abnormal, de-
pend on brain function. Limitations in our knowledge, however, sometimes make it impos-
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orders 22 in which organic brain impairment is not present.2 Medical
sible to determine whether a given mental disorder in a given individual should be consid-
ered an organic mental disorder (because it is due to brain dysfunction of known organic
etiology) or whether it should be diagnosed as other than an Organic Mental Disorder
(because it is more adequately accounted for as a response to psychological or social fac-
tors [as in Adjustment Disorder] or because the presence of a specific organic factor has
not been established [as in Schizophrenia]).
The organic factor responsible for an Organic Mental Disorder may be a primary dis-
ease of the brain or a systemic illness that secondarily affects the brain. It may also be a
substance or toxic agent that is either currently disturbing brain function or has left some
long-lasting effect. Withdrawal of a substance on which an individual has become physio-
logically dependent is another cause of Organic Mental Disorder.
Id. at 101-02.
20. DSM-III describes psychosis as:
A term indicating gross impairment in reality testing. It may be used to describe the
behavior of an individual at a given time, or a mental disorder in which at some time
during its course all individuals with the disorder have grossly impaired reality testing.
When there is gross impairment in reality testing, the individual incorrectly evaluates the
accuracy of his or her perceptions and thoughts and makes incorrect inferences about ex-
ternal reality, even in the face of contrary evidence. The term psychotic does not apply to
minor distortions of reality that involve matters of relative judgment.
DSM-III, supra note 18, at 367-68.
21. DSM-III describes a neurotic disorder as
a mental disorder in which the predominant disturbance is a symptom or group of symp-
toms that is distressing to the individual and is recognized by him or her as unacceptable
and alien (ego-dystonic); reality testing is grossly intact. Behavior does not actively violate
gross social norms (though it may be quite disabling). The disturbance is relatively endur-
ing or recurrent without treatment, and is not limited to a transitory reaction to stressors.
There is no demonstrable organic etiology or factor.
Id. at 364.
The classifications of neurosis are varied and broad in character. "There are a large num-
ber of neuroses: anxiety, hysterical, obsessive-compulsive, depressive, and others." A. BROOKS,
supra note 18, at 39; see Comment, Workmen's Compensation Awards, supra note 2, at 1131-
32. Moreover, "[a] neurosis ordinarily prevents a person from functioning rationally and in such
a way as to maximize his potential." A. BROOKS, supra note 18, at 39. Consequently, any of the
various neurotic syndromes "can result in either a partial or total inability of the individual to
perform some or all of his normal activities." Comment, Workmen's Compensation Awards,
supra note 2, at 1132.
22. Personality traits are enduring patterns of perceiving, relating to, and thinking
about the environment and oneself, and are exhibited in a wide range of important social
and personal contexts. It is only when personality traits are inflexible and maladaptiae
and cause either significant impairment in social or occupational functioning or subjective
distress that they constitute Personality Disorders. The manifestations of Personality Dis-
orders are generally recognizable by adolescence or earlier and continue throughout most
of adult life, though they become less obvious in middle or old age.
DSM-II, supra note 18, at 305 (emphasis in original). DSM-III expressly recognizes that a
clinical finding of a single, specific personality disorder that adequately describes an individ-
ual's disturbed personality functioning "can only be done with difficulty, since many individu-
als exhibit features that are not limited to a single Personality Disorder." Id. at 306.
23. Psychosis, neurosis, and personality disorders are the "three basic categories of nonor-
ganic mental illness with which the lawyer is likely to come in contact." A. BROOKS, supra note
18, at 37.
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authorities generally have characterized all these disorders as
"mental"-as opposed to "physical" or "bodily"-because they mani-
fest themselves by mental symptoms, whereas bodily disorders result
in symptoms in organic systems other than the brain.24 The distinc-
tion that experts describe between mental and bodily disorders, how-
ever, is medically and, arguably, epistomologically erroneous.2 5
The precise etiology of most mental disorders is inexplicable.26
Mental disorders result from an extraordinarily complex interrelation
between an individual's internal or subjective reality and his external
or environmental reality.2 7 An individual's subjective reality is psy-
24. See Szasz, The Myth of Mental Illness, 15 AM. PSYCHOLOGY 113, 113 (1960).
25. As Dr. Selzer states:
The relation of stress to emotional illness and physical disease ... may be spurious.
Every significant deleterious physical alteration must have an emotional accompaniment
or reaction. One does not usually sustain a physical injury or suffer a significant physical
illness without some change from the pre-existing emotional state. Similarly, emotional
changes often produce a related physiological or metabolic alteration, albeit evanescent,
reversible, or as yet undiscovered.
Seizer, supra note 2, at 952. See Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance As Legal Damage, 20 MICH.
L. Rav. 497, 498-503 (1922); Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress, supra note 8, at
1241. Dr. Szasz argues that the distinction reflects an epistemological bias:
[The] error in regarding complex psychosocial behavior, consisting of communications
about ourselves and the world about us, as mere symptoms of neurological functioning is
epistemological. In other words, it is an error pertaining not to any mistakes in observa-
tion or reasoning, as such, but rather to the way in which we organize and express our
knowledge. In the present case, the error lies in making a symmetrical dualism between
mental and physical (or bodily) symptoms, a dualism which is merely a habit of speech
and to which no known observations can be found to correspond .... In medical practice,
when we speak of physical disturbances, we mean either signs (for example, a fever) or
symptoms (for example, pain). We speak of mental symptoms, on the other hand, when we
refer to a patient's communications about himself, others, and the world about him....
The statement that "X is a mental symptom" involves rendering a judgment. The judg-
ment entails ... a covert comparison or matching of the patient's ideas, concepts, or be-
lieves [sic] with those of the observer and the society in which they live. The notion of
mental symptom is therefore inextricably tied to the social (including ethical) context in
which it is made in much the same way as the notion of bodily symptom is tied to an
anatomical and genetic context.
Szasz, supra note 24, at 113-14 (emphasis in original).
26. Medical authorities have universally acknowledged this conclusion, except in cases in
which an individual suffers a mental disorder directly as a result of an organic injury to his
central nervous system. See DMS-III, supra note 18, at 6-7; Lesser & Kiev, supra note 2, at
241; Smith & Solomon, supra note 2, at 113-14.
27. "It is clear ... that a variety of stresses-personal, social, and environmen-
tal-contribute to human mental ... illness." Seizer, supra note 2, at 961. Drs. Lanzer and
Michael have observed succinctly that "[t]he multiple causation of a mental disorder in any
individual case is always apparent to the clinician. Cases with deceptively simple etiology may
turn out to be quite complex in origin." T. LANZER & S. MICHAEL, LIFE STRESS AND MENTAL
HEALTH 5 (1963); see L. KOLB & A. NoYs, MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 116 (7th ed. 1968); A.
LEIGHTON, Mental Illness and Acculturation, in MEDICINE AND ANTHROPOLOGY 121-22 (1959); J.
TITCHENER & W. Ross, 3 AMERICAN HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 44 (2d ed. 1974); Brill, supra
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chogenic; its roots may lie in his experience or in his organic or ge-
netic disposition. 8 An individual's external or environmental reality
includes the gamut of potential social stresses and, if the individual is
employed, the stresses of his work environment. 9
The precise psychogenesis of an individual's subjective reality is
impossible to determine.30 Moreover, the interrelation between sub-
jective and environmental realities is so profoundly complex that no
method exists either to quantify or to qualify the extent to which one
reality and not the other is a cause of mental disorder.31 Therefore,
the time lapse between an external stress and the manifestation of
mental disorder symptoms, and the intensity, suddenness, or gradu-
alness of the external symptoms are irrelevant in determining
cause.32 The impossibility of measuring the contributing causes of a
mental disorder undoubtedly is the source of the artificial distinction
between mental and bodily disorders. When mental disorder symp-
toms appear in parts of the body other than the brain, medical sci-
ence is able, in most cases, to attach a quantitative or qualitative eti-
ological probability. Scientists cannot make this determination,
however, when the symptoms manifest themselves subjectively.33 An
individual who suffers a mental disorder has an a priori personal,
subjective vulnerability or predisposition to the disorder.3 4 This pre-
note 2, at 300; Smith & Solomon, supra note 2, at 90; Comment, Workmen's Compensation
Awards, supra note 2, at 1142.
28. See A. LEIGHTON, supra note 27; Smith, Problems of Proof, supra note 8, at 591-92;
Comment, Workmen's Compensation Awards,.supra note 2, at 1142.
29. The definition of stress is "any circumstance, situation, or event that causes or accel-
erates the development of human emotional or physical disability or disease." Seizer, supra
note 2, at 951. Social stresses include "conflicting emotions and desires, fears and worries, and
anxieties in ordinary civilian circumstances" such as "discontent with a job, fear of losing one's
income, unsatisfactory marital relations, lack of good social adjustments, and almost any vari-
ety of meal-adjustment." Smith & Solomon, supra note 8, at 9&.
30. See Comment, Workmen's Compensation Awards, supra note 2, at 1142.
31. Psychiatry has not advanced to the point where it is an exact science in the same
sense that physical medicine is an exact science. A physician ... is able to declare posi-
tively whether or not [an individual] has a fracture. He can even describe its duration and
severity in detail. Psychiatry, on the other hand, cannot be so positive about neuroses and
mental illness ... [because it must take] cognizance of all the influences that have come
to bear on the individual throughout his lifetime.
Smith, Problems of Proof, supra note 8, at 633 n.138; see T. LANZER & S. MICHAEL, supra note
27, at 1142-43; Brill, supra note 2, at 300.
32. Selzer, supra note 2, at 955-56; Comment, Workmen's Compensation Awards, supra
note 2, at 1139-40. The existence of a physical stress element does not assure an etiological
relationship. Id. at 1137-38.
33. Smith, Problems of Proof, supra note 8, at 633 n.138.
34. See id. at 591-92; Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress, supra note 8, at
1257. Experts have verified empirically that persons with mental disorders possess a vulnerabil-
ity to the disorder. See Smith & Solomon, supra note 2, at 281-82, 303; Comment, Negligently
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disposition is an etiologically crucial factor; 5 its existence raises an
important corollary problem. Although mental injuries medically are
as genuine as physical disorders,36 their subjective quality creates the
possibility that the individual may feign a mental disorder.3 7 The
spectre of fraud has influenced judicial attitudes toward mental
injuries.3 8
III. COMMON-LAW TORT RECOVERY FOR MENTAL DISTRESS
A. Interests in Freedom from Mental Distress
Courts have recognized certain common-law causes of action in
which a plaintiff is entitled to independent protection from conduct
that results in mental distress. The important analytical denominator
in these actions is the existence of limiting, qualifying standards,
which the judiciary imposes and expresses as prima facie elements of
an action. These limiting standards directly reflect policy choices. 9
Inflicted Mental Distress, supra note 8, at 1257.
35. Smith & Solomon, supra note 2, at 90; see supra note 34 and accompanying text.
36. See Smith & Solomon, supra note 2, at 113; Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental
Distress, supra note 8, at 1258; Comment, Workmen's Compensation Awards, supra note 2, at
1132, 1137.
37. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment b (1965); Smith & Solomon,
supra note 2, at 99. Psychiatric literature uses the term "malingering" to describe the conscious
counterfeiting of a mental condition. Experts also recognize that "[t]he borderline between neu-
rosis and malingering is tenuous and uncertain." Turner, The Anatomy of Psychiatric Cross-
Examination, in PSYCHIATRY FOR LAWYERs HANDBOOK 89, 95 (J. Arrowsmith ed. 1966). See 13
W. MALONE & H. JOHNSON, supra note 2, § 262; Keschner, Simulation of Nervous and Mental
Disease, 44 MICH. L. REV. 715 (1946); Smith, Problems of Proof, supra note 8, at 614; Smith &
Solomon, supra note 2, at 125; Usdin, Neurosis Following Trauma, in LAW, MEDICINE, SCI-
ENCE-AND JUsTICE 237, 244 (L. Bear ed. 1964); Comment, Workmen's Compensation Awards,
supra note 2, at 1146.
38. See infra notes 45, 47, 51, 57, 105-06, 112, 133, & 166 and accompanying text.
39. At the beginning of the twentieth century courts began to recognize the right of pa-
trons of common carriers and other public utilities to be free from emotional distress that re-
sulted from the insults of employees of the carrier or utility. See 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES,
supra note 8, § 9.3, at 670-73; W. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 12, at 52-53; RESTATEMENT (FIRST)
OF TORTS § 48 (1934); Magruder, supra note 8, at 1050-54. Prior to the recognition of a pro-
tected interest in freedom from emotional distress, conduct that caused mental distress was
actionable only under an assault theory. 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 8, § 9.1, at 666;
Magruder, supra note 8, at 1059. The rationales for the new cause of action revealed two com-
peting policy considerations. First, courts recognized an interest in decent, courteous service for
patrons of common carriers and other utilities. This interest entitled patrons to protection
against conduct that the common carriers reasonably could calculate would produce emotional
distress. See 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 8, § 9.3, at 671-72; Magruder, supra note 8, at
1051. Second, courts implicitly recognized the subjective dimension of emotional injuries by
requiring that the defendant's misconduct be objectively abusive and that the plaintiff's emo-
tional injury be reasonable compared to the abusive conduct. The latter limitation undermined
the legal effect of an individual plaintiff's subjective vulnerability to emotional injury, by mea-
suring the emotional injury with a reasonable person standard. Also, the requirement that the
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Judicially imposed limiting standards in mental injury tort ac-
insulting conduct be objectively abusive added an analytical assurance that a reasonable person
would have suffered emotional distress. Both requirements reflected the courts' attempt to
guard against fraudulent emotional distress claims and to prevent recovery for emotional dis-
tress so subjective in nature that it was "unreasonably" trivial. W. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 12,
at 54; see RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 46 comment b (1965). Courts extended the liabil-
ity principles applicable to common carriers and public utilities to innkeepers and hotel owners
for humiliation and insults arising from conduct of their employees-a situation in which the
relation of the parties entitled the patron to respectful and decent treatment. See F. HARPER &
F. JAMES, supra note 8, § 9.3, at 673; W. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 12, at 53.
Courts next began to recognize actions concerning language that was insufficiently abusive
to constitute assault but so insulting and abusive that it objectively resulted in mental distress.
In these cases, however, physical illness had to accompany mental distress. See 1 F. HARPER &
F. JAMES, supra note 8, § 9.2, at 668-69; RESTATEMENT (FIRsT) OF TORTS § 46 (1934). Here too,
the courts intended the requirements that the plaintiff physically manifest his mental suffering
and that a person reasonably would expect the distress as a result of the abusive quality of the
insults as policy measures to assure both the genuineness of the claim and its social worthiness.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment k (1965).
These causes of action provided the analytical and policy bases for the recognition of an
action for objectively severe mental distress arising from extreme and outrageous conduct of
another that is intentional or reckless. See 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 8, § 9.1, at 667-
68. The Restatement (First) of Torts first formally recognized this action providing that "[o]ne
who, without privilege to do so, intentionally causes severe emotional distress to another is
liable (a) for such emotional distress and (b) for bodily harm resulting from it." RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF TORTS § 46 (Supp. 1948). The Restatement (Second) of Torts now provides: "One
who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional
distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the
other results from it, for such bodily harm." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965). In
addition, the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides standards for determining liability when
one recklessly or intentionally directs extreme and outrageous conduct at a third person. Id. §
46(2). The Restatement (Second) of Torts also states that "[t]he [emotional] distress must be
reasonable and justified under the circumstances, and there is no liability where the plaintiff
has suffered exaggerated and unreasonable emotional distress, unless it results from a peculiar
susceptibility to such distress of which the actor has knowledge." Id. § 46 comment j; see id. §
46 comment f. A clear majority of jurisdictions have adopted this cause of action. See W. PROS-
SER, supra note 8, § 12, at 59.
Like the abusive common carrier cause of action, the cause of action for mental distress
reflects competing policies. On the one hand, it fills the technical gap between assault and the
action that permits recovery for emotional distress when a special relationship exists. See RE-
STATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS §§ 46 comment b, 48 (1965); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra
note 8, § 9.1, at 666. On the other hand, the purpose of the different elements in a mental
distress actions-requirements that the conduct be intentional or reckless, objectively extreme
and outrageous, and that the emotional injury be objectively severe as compared to the miscon-
duct-is to assure that the plaintiff's injury is not fraudulent and is worthy of social protection.
See W. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 12, at 51; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment b
(1965).
Courts almost universally have adhered to the position that a plaintiff's mental distress
alone is insufficient to give rise to a cause of action in negligence. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES,
supra note 8, § 18.4; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 312, 313, 436, 436a (1965); Comment,
Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress, supra note 8. But see Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398,
520 P.2d 758 (1974). Courts have been aware of the proof problems that exist concerning both
the genuineness of the injury and the causal relationship between a defendant's negligence and
the injury, given the subjective dimension of mental injuries. Courts also have denied liability
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tions embody two primary policy choices: the choice to .minimize the
risk of fraud and the choice to guarantee the genuineness of the in-
jury.40 The apparent importance of these policies, however, is mis-
leading. In mental injury tort actions that concern extreme and out-
rageous conduct which is intentional or reckless, for example, the
outrageousness of the misconduct, the injury's severity, and the rea-
sonableness of the injury compared to the misconduct, do not guar-
antee the genuineness of a mental injury.41 The judicially imposed
limiting standards in these actions, therefore, only provide the ap-
pearance of genuineness. 42 Moreover, in actions that concern negli-
gent infliction of mental distress, the physical injury requirement, the
requirement that the injury be reasonable vis-A-vis the misconduct,
and the physical impact requirement only assure the appearance of
because the triers have viewed the emotional injuries as too trivial compared with a defendant's
negligent misconduct to warrant recovery. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 8, § 18.4, at
1032; McNiece, Psychic Injury and Tort Liability in New York, 24 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1, 33
(1949); Smith, Relation of Emotion to Injury and Disease, supra note 8, at 208. Courts have
implemented these policies through their treatment of the elements of a negligence ac-
tion-duty, proximate (or legal) causation, and remoteness of damage requirements. See 2 F.
HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 8, § 18.4, at 1033, 1035-39; Smith, Relation of Emotion to
Injury and Disease, supra note 8, at 208-12.
Courts generally have permitted recovery for emotional distress in a negligence action
when physical or bodily injury accompanies the distress. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 313, 436 (1965); Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress, supra note 8, at 1240-42.
Courts have recognized that recovery for emotional distress in this instance is essentially "para-
sitic." See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 8, § 18.4, at 1032; Comment, Negligently In-
flicted Mental Distress, supra note 8, at 1240. Originally, courts did not allow recovery unless
the defendant's negligence also generated a physicial trauma or impact on the plaintiff that
brought on his emotional and bodily illness. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 8, § 18.4,
at 1032-33; Smith, Relation of Emotion to Injury and Disease, supra note 8, at 207-12. Courts
expressly rooted the "impact requirement" in the policy of providing a "guaranty of merit to
counterbalance risks of fraud." Judges located the impact requirement in the duty or proximate
causation elements of the action. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 8, § 18.4, at 1033.
A majority of jurisdictions have repudiated the impact requirement. See W. PROSSER,
supra note 8, § 54, at 332-33; RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §§ 312 comment d, 313 com-
ment c (1965). Even if courts reject this requirement, however, a plaintiff's emotional and bod-
ily injury still must be reasonable compared to defendant's conduct. The purpose of the reason-
ableness requirement is to counterbalance "risks of fraud" in a less mechanical fashion than
does the impact requirement. Its effect is to disallow consideration of the subjective dimension
of the individual plaintiff's emotional and physical illness.
40. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
41. See supra notes 30-32 & 39 and accompanying text.
42. Courts have articulated another policy rationale for the limiting criteria in mental
injury actions dealing with intentional or outrageous misconduct that is more creditable than
the "appearance of genuineness" argument- that some mental disorders are not socially worthy
of legal protection. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. Under the "social worthiness"
rationale, the law entitles to protection only disorders that are objectively severe, or reasonable,
disorders. When the disorder does not meet these objective criteria, the court considers as a
matter of policy that a mental injury is too subjective, or trivial, to warrant protection.
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genuineness. These qualifying standards cannot guarantee that an in-
jury is real because physical manifestations of a mental injury medi-
cally do not assure genuineness, and the nature and intensity of an
alleged causal stimulus or the reasonableness of the injury are irrele-
vant to the origins of the injury.43
The judge decides whether the plaintiffs have met the limiting
prima facie standards in actions for mental distress. If a court finds
that reasonable persons would not differ concerning whether the
plaintiff has satisfied each requirement, it chooses, in an evaluative
policy decision, to exclude the plaintiff's claim by nonsuiting it. If,
however, a court finds that reasonable persons might disagree in their
judgments, the court passes its initial evaluative decision to the jury
for ultimate determination.44 The policy decisions in common-law
mental injury cases, therefore, occur within the appropriate domains
of the court and jury in the same manner in which judges and juries
make threshold policy based determinations in other types of cases.45
B. Factual Causation and Mental Distress
The determination whether the defendant's misconduct has
caused the plaintiff's injury in a factual sense is an element of every
personal injury action.46 The difficulty in establishing factual causa-
tion is epistemological: the trier of fact never absolutely can deter-
mine the "fact" of causation. 47 Although the jury makes the ultimate
43. See supra notes 30-32 & 39 and accompanying text. The more accurate policy ration-
ale for the prima facie limitations is that mental injuries which arise from negligent conduct
and which do not satisfy these limiting conditions are unworthy of legal protection. See supra
note 39 and accompanying text.
44. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §§ 46 comments h, j, 328B, 328C (1965).
45. For a discussion whether the court should decide the policy standards, see R. KEEroN,
supra note 12, at 3-63, 147-66; Theis, The Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: A Need
for Limits on Liability, 27 DE PAUL L. REv. 275 (1977).
46. See P. ATrrA, ACCIDENTS COMPENSATION AND THE LAW 123 (1970); 2 F. HARPER & F.
JAMES, supra note 8, § 20.2, at 1110; RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §§ 430 comment e, 431
comment e (1965).
47. Philosophers of science have produced extensive literature on this point. See M.
BUNGE, CAUSALITY AND MODERN SCIENCE 132-33 (3d ed. 1979); E. WAGEL, THE STRUCTURE OF
SCIENCE, ch. 10 (1961).
The proof of a factual causal relation must depend entirely upon probabilities. Human
experience-often supported in the courtroom by expert testimony-dictates that certain phe-
nomena cluster in. groups: when fact A is presented, fact B accompanies it. The existence of a
causal relation, therefore, "can be nothing more than 'the projection of our habit of expecting
certain consequences to follow certain antecedents merely because we [have] observed these
sequences on previous occasions."' W. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 41, at 242 (footnote omitted);
see 13 W. MALONE & H. JOHNSON, supra note 2, § 252, at 546.
The concept of "probability" is as elusive philosophically as the concept of "causation."
According to Professor Chisholm, an argument is inductively probable when "[t]wo proposi-
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determination of factual causation, like other factual questions,"8 the
court plays a crucial role in the process. Generally, the trier of fact
establishes causation in accord with noncommunicative formulas that
tions, c and h, may be so related logically that the proposition h may be said to be proba-
ble-that is, more probable than not-in relation to proposition c." R. CHISHOLM, THEORY OF
KNOWLEDGE 8 (1966). Professor Chisholm defines absolute probability as follows: "A proposi-
tion h is probable in the absolute sense for a given subject S, provided that h is probable in the
inductive sense, in relation to the conjunction of all those propositions that S knows to be
true." Id. at 9. Because factual causation determinations are made within the respective do-
mains of judges and juries, Professor Chisholm's statement more accurately should refer to the
conjunctions of all propositions that S believes to be true. Indeed, jury instructions generally
invoke a coherence theory of truth, in which the judicial system asks jurors to believe those
propositions that are consistent with the set of beliefs the jurors already hold. Id. at 113 n.16.
The evidence that plaintiffs utilize to prove factual causation in mental injury cases also follows
a kind of coherence theory because the plaintiffs use evidence to explain behavior within the
framework of given values or beliefs.
The standard that courts utilize most frequently to assure that one event is antecedent to
another is the "but-for" test: society should not charge the defendant with responsibility for
the plaintiff's injury unless the judicial system can conclude that the injury could not have
occurred in the absence of the defendant's misconduct. See ATiYAH, supra note 8, § 41, at 238-
40; 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 8, § 20.2, at 1110; Malone, supra note 2, at 63-67. The
"but-for" test, however, is laden with philosophical and analytical problems. From a philosoph-
ical perspective, "[t]he essential weakness of the 'but-for' test is the fact that it ignores the
irresistible urge of the trier to pass judgment at the same time that it observes. It is an intellec-
tual strait jacket to which the human mind will not willingly submit." Malone, supra note 2, at
66-67 (footnote omitted); see D. HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING § V,
pt. 1 (1748). Furthermore, application of the test can pose analytical difficulties. F. HARPER & F.
JAMES, supra note 8, § 20.2, at 1110. The two main types of cases in which these difficulties
arise are: First, "cases of omissions, in which the enquiries into what would have happened are
inescapable and difficult under the 'but for' test," and second, cases concerning multiple causal
factors. ATIYAH, supra note 2, at 67, 89-97; W. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 41, at 239-41.
Professor Malone has concluded that decisions which courts make about causation as a
result of applying the but-for test rest not on scientific causation but rather on judgmental,
evaluative principles. Malone, supra note 2, at 97-99; see N. GOODMAN, FACT, FICTION AND
FORECAST 9 (1965). The Restatement (Second) of Torts, accordingly, has declared that the de-
fendant's misconduct must also be a "substantial factor" in bringing about the plaintiff's in-
jury. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 431, 432 (1965). The "substantial factor" re-
quirement includes the "necessary antecedent" concept of the but-for test except "[i]f two
forces are actively operating, one because of the actor's [conduct], the other not because of any
misconduct on his part, and each of itself is sufficient to bring about harm to another. . . ." Id.
§ 432. The but-for test is necessary but not sufficient to prove the existence of a "substantial
factor" causal relation. Id. § 431 comment a.
Professors Hart and Honore have criticized the use of the substantial factor standard be-
cause it is not definable or reducible into lesser terms. H. HART & A. HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE
LAW 216-18, 263-66 (1959). Dean Green, however, in response to their argument, has stated that
given the use of the standard within the context of "the procedural apparatus of the litigation
process in allocating the functions of judge and jury," reducing the term further is neither
necessary nor desirable. Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L.
REV. 544, 554 (1962).
48. See L. GREEN, THE RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE 135 (1927); W. PROSSER, supra
note 8, § 41, at 237; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 434 (1965); Malone, supra note 2, at 60-
61.
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measure the quality or quantity of required proof in terms of
probabilities. In most cases the factual probabilities preponderate
so clearly that the court need not submit the causation issue to the
jury.50 Exceptions to this generalization exist, however. "[W]henever
the judicial process demands an answer to the unknowable .. .the
wide range of language makes it possible for the judge to exclude the
jury from participation or to enlist its full and conclusive service, just
as he may see fit."51 In these cases a judge's evaluation of the
probabilities of a factual causation controversy is tremendously im-
portant. The court's intuitive evaluation takes into account not only
moral, social, and economic beliefs and attitudes, but also an attitude
toward the purposes of accident compensation law.52
In mental injury cases neither common sense nor expert testi-
mony provides data that antecedently can associate the plaintiff's in-
jury with the defendant's conduct on a more-probable-than-not ba-
sis.53 Because no one fully understands the causal elements in mental
injuries, the evaluative latitude of a court in the factual causation
inquiry in these cases is extraordinarily broad. In every mental injury
case a court may find that the factual probabilities do not preponder-
ate to the degree that a reasonable difference of opinion exists
whether the defendant's conduct caused the plaintiff's mental injury.
Thus, a court potentially could declare a nonsuit in every mental in-
49. See W. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 41, at 241. One noncommunicative formula, for ex-
ample, is: "[The plaintiff] must introduce evidence which affords a reasonable basis for the
conclusion that it is more likely than not that the conduct of the defendant was a substantial
factor in bringing about the result." Id.; see RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 433B comment
b (1965); Malone, supra note 2, at 68; Note, Causation in Disease: Quantum of Proof Required
to Reach the Jury, 53 Nw. L. REv. 793 (1959). In addition, a common description of the appro-
priate measurement of proof is that the plaintiff must prove the causation standard by "the
preponderance of the evidence." Green, supra note 47, at 554; see Malone, supra note 2, at 68.
According to Professor Malone, however,
[w]henever the judge has concluded that the showing on the issue of cause is not sufficient
to warrant a submission to the jury, he is likely to emphasize that there is a sharp distinc-
tion between a 'mere possibility' and a showing of 'probability' or 'reasonable probability.'
... On the other hand, whenever the court is willing to accept the judgment of the jury
on the cause issue, it will not encounter the slightest difficulty in finding acceptable and
convincing language to justify the refusal of a nonsuit. Instead of emphasizing the distinc-
tion between 'possibilities' and 'probabilities' the judge will likely call attention to the fact
that no inference can be proved to a certainty. It is enough that it is 'reasonable.'
Id. at 68-69.
50. See Malone, supra note 2, at 71.
51. Id. (footnote omitted).
52. Id. at 62-64; see Green, supra note 47, at 555; Small, supra note 2, at 651-59. For a
discussion of the relevance of these analytical phenomena of factual causation to workers' com-
pensation mental injury cases, see infra notes 202-04 and accompanying text.
53. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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jury claim on the factual causation issue. In each case, however, a
court also may reach the opposite result-finding that the factual
probabilities do preponderate to the extent that a reasonable differ-
ence of opinion exists whether the defendant's conduct caused the
plaintiff's mental injury. Because the court has enormous latitude in
its preponderance of the evidence finding, the factual causation issue
in every mental injury case potentially could be an issue for the jury's
determination.
54
The factual causation issue, however, has not surfaced as a focal
issue in mental injury cases because the determination whether the
plaintiff's injury is reasonable conceptually assimilates the factual
causation inquiry.55 In causes of action that recognize an independent
interest in freedom from mental distress and even in negligence ac-
tions concerning mental distress, courts commonly apply a policy
based limitation that the plaintiff's injury must be "reasonable" in
relation to the defendant's misconduct.56 As a practical matter, the
limitation means that if a court nonsuits a plaintiff or directs a ver-
dict against him on the policy ground that his injury is unreasonable
vis-a-vis the defendant's misconduct, the court implicitly asserts a
belief that the defendant's misconduct was not in a more-probable-
than-not sense a cause of the plaintiff's injury. If, however, a court
finds that a reasonable difference of opinion exists about the reasona-
bleness of the plaintiff's injury and lets the issue go to the jury, the
court implicitly adjudges a reasonable difference of opinion regarding
the factual causation issue. The judge or the jury, therefore, makes
the same policy choices in both the factual cause and "reasonable-
54. See Green, supra note 47, at 553-54; Malone, supra note 2, at 68-72; supra note 49
and accompanying text.
55. The Restatement (Second) of Torts' description of the standard for causation in neg-
ligently inflicted emotional and physical injury cases implicitly suggests this conclusion. In
elaborating on the "substantial factor" standard stated in §§ 431-432, the Restatement
comments:
While it is necessary that the negligent conduct be a substantial factor in bringing about
the fright and that the fright also be a substantial factor in bringing about the illness, it is
not necessary that the fright be a probable result of the negligence nor the illness a proba-
ble result of the fright. It is enough that it is a 'natural' result, using that word as denoting
that men of ordinary experience and judgment would not regard the result as extraordi-
nary, after expert testimony has given them the medical information necessary to enable
them to form an intelligent opinion.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436 comment d (1965); see id. §§ 431-432. This causation
standard has an identical analytical effect to the requirement that the plaintiff's mental and
physical illness be reasonable as compared to the defendant's misconduct. Therefore, if the
plaintiff's case satisfies the reasonableness requirement, it a fortiori satisfies the causation stan-
dard. See Brody, supra note 8, at 260.
56. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
1983]
280 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:263
ness" determinations. The court may decide the issues initially or re-
fer them to the jury, but in either situation the basis of decision is
the probable relation between the defendant's misconduct and the
plaintiff's mental injury. 7
IV. WORKERS' COMPENSATION MENTAL DISABILITIES: THE CAUSATION
ISSUE
A. The Purpose and Structure of Workers' Compensation
Systems
Workers' compensation systems are bottomed on political com-
promise.58 The employer, through the mechanism of insurance, bears
the initial cost of injuries that result from employment related risks
and waives the immunity it might otherwise enjoy if it were not at
fault. The employee, in turn, surrenders his common-law right to sue
in tort when an employment related risk creates his injury. Instead,
the employee receives legislatively determined compensation bene-
fits.5 The compromise between employer and employee embodies the
central policy of the compensation system. 0
57. To resolve the factual causation issue in mental injury cases, either the court or the
jury must engage in the evaluative process of determining whether the defendant's part in the
occurrence of the plaintiff's injury was sufficient to create an appearance that the defendant
ought to pay for the injury. The effect of this process is essentially distributive: if a judge
decides, based on his initial evaluative judgment, to allow the jury to decide the factual causa-
tion issue, he is permitting the jury to form its moral, social, or economic judgment about which
party should bear the cost of the plaintiff's emotional injury. Malone, supra note 2, at 98-99.
58. For an excellent analysis of the sociopolitical background of the enactment of workers'
compensation statutes, see Friedman & Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of Industrial
Accidents, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 50 (1967). The authors concluded:
In essence. . . workmen's compensation was designed to replace a highly unsatisfac-
tory system with a rational, actuarial one. It should not be viewed as the replacement of a
fault-oriented compensation system with one unconcerned with fault. It should not be
viewed as a victory of employees over employers .... [The] system was itself a compro-
mise: an attempt at a new, workable, and predictable mode of handling accident liability
which neatly balanced the interests of labor and management.
Id. at 71-72. For a discussion of the employer's common-law defenses prior to the enactment of
workers' compensation statutes (the "unholy trinity" of contributory negligence, assumption of
the risk, and the fellow-servant rule), the sociolegal dimensions of tort claims and industrial
accidents, and the historical development of workers' compensation legislation, see 1 A. LAR-
SON, supra note 2, §§ 4.00-5.30; 13 W. MALONE & H. JOHNSON, supra note 2, §§ 3, 31; COMPEN-
DIUM, supra note 2, at 11-19; Rabin, Some Thoughts on Tort Law From a Sociopolitical Per-
spective, 1969 Wis. L. REv. 51, 53, 60-66.
59. 13 W. MALONE & H. JOHNSON, supra note 2, § 32.
60. The system's compromise-or quid pro quo-between employers and employees is
also the system's purpose; the primary legislative intent of a workers' compensation system is
to regulate statutorily the allocation of losses that result from employment related injuries.
Commentators have discussed extensively various justifications for the system's primary pur-
pose. Writers most often explain the employer's trade-off in economic terms:
1983] WORKERS' COMPENSATION
The structure of workers' compensation systems evolves from
this compromise. Every system contains two basic limitations to re-
covery. First, an employee must suffer a "personal injury by accident
arising out of and in the course of the employment."61 This legislative
standard is the system's "coverage formula,"62 and is the primary
method by which the legislature defines employment related risks.6"
Second, an employee's injury must result in a disability that entails
total or partial incapacity to work. Generally, workers' compensation
The expected cost of injury or death to workers can be anticipated and provided for in
advance through the medium of insurance, and the premiums can be regarded as an item
of production cost in fixing the price of the commodity or service.
Under this approach the element of personal fault either disappears entirely or is sub-
ordinated to broader economic considerations. The employer absorbs the cost of accident
loss only initially; it is expected that this cost will eventually pass down the stream of
commerce in the form of increased price until it is spread in dilution among the ultimate
consumers.
Id. (footnote omitted); see COMPENDIUM, supra note 2, at 21-23. Proponents of this rationale
expect workers' compensation systems to
allocate the costs of the program among employers and industries according to the extent
to which they are responsible for the losses to employees and other expenses. Such an
allocation is considered equitable by supporters of this objective because each employer
and industry pays for its fair share of the cost. The economic effects are considered desira-
ble because this allocation tends in the long run in a competitive economy to shift re-
sources from hazardous industries to safe industries and from unsafe employers within an
industry to safe employers.
COMPENDIUM, supra note 2, at 25. The employee's trade-off is justifiable from a "broad eco-
nomic viewpoint":
[P]redictability and moderateness of cost are necessary from the broad economic
viewpoint. . . . [T]hese are also desirable from the personal point of view of -[the]
worker. . . . The great need of the employee is for immediate cash to meet his emergency.
If the amount of his claim is likely to be disputed, the delays of the old system and the
inequities of compromise will be resurrected and one of the human purposes of compensa-
tion will be lost. Furthermore, if the worker is to be guaranteed at least a minimum sum to
care for medical expense and support for each and every accident, it is perhaps not unfair
that he should forego his former claim to be fully remunerated for pain and suffering and
those intangible elements that go into the makeup of a conventional damage suit.
13 W. MALONE & H. JOHNSON, supra note 2, § 32; see H.E. DowNEY, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
35 (1924); COMPENDIUM, supra note 2, at 24-26; Gregory & Gisser, Theoretical Aspects of
Workmen's Compensation, in SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES FOR THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 107 (1973); Larson, Basic Concepts & Objectives of Work-
men's Compensation, in SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES FOR THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 31, 33-37 (1973).
61. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
62. By moving from a fault to a no-fault system, one does not escape problems of
causal relation. . . . If . . . one accepts the premise that certain activities-like . . . in-
dustrial activity-should pay their own way in terms of accident costs, then some test
must be employed to distinguish those accidents that are caused by the activity from the
remainder of injury causing activities in the world.
J. O'CONNELL & R. HENDERSON, TORT LAW, NO-FAULT AND BEYOND 362 (1975).
63. See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
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systems measure disability according to the employee's impaired
earning capacity."' The disability requirement also reflects the sys-
tem's attention to compensation of only employment related loss.
Legislatures usually charge administrative agencies with effectu-
ating the policies of workers' compensation systems.6 5 The agencies
generally include administrative law judges, who handle the adminis-
trative trial process, and an administrative appeal board, which hears
initial appeals."6 Workers can make secondary appeals to legislatively
designated courts, 67 subject to appellate review principles that the ju-
diciary or the legislature has adopted."8 The purpose of the system's
administrative structure is to implement the underlying policy justifi-
cation for the employee's trade-off: theoretically, a decisionmaking
process specifically designed to resolve workers' compensation claims
provides efficient and prompt payment to the disabled employee in
immediate need. 9
B. The Causation Inquiry
1. Policy or Legal Causation
Under the common law, courts have the exclusive power to de-
fine the policy limits of tort liability.70 In workers' compensation sys-
tems, however, courts must decide whether an injury is employment
related based on the legislative directives that the coverage formula
64. 2 A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 57.00. For an extensive discussion of issues relating to
what constitutes disability, see id. §§ 57.10-.66.
65. See 1 A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 1.10; W. MALONE, M. PLANT & J. LITTLE, supra note
2, at 400.
[Tihere are still five states that continue to rely on court administration of the law ...
[F]our of the states (Alabama, New Mexico, Tennessee and Wyoming) provide an agency
with limited powers of enforcement and functions such as compiling statistics, publication
of forms, filing notices and similar more or less clinical work. Louisiana has no administra-
tive agency whatsoever and relies entirely on court administration and the litigation
process.
Id.; see COMPENDIUM, supra note 2, at 34-35. For a discussion of the effect of court administra-
tion on workers' compensation mental disability cases, see infra note 228 and accompanying
text.
66. See 3 A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 80.12; W. MALONE, M. PLANT & J. LITTLE, supra
note 2, at 412.
67. See 3 A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 80.10; 4 A. LARSON, supra note 8, at app. A, table 20;
W. MALONE, M. PLANT & J. LITTLE, supra note 2, at 412.
68. See infra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
69. For a discussion of the efficiency justification, see W. MALONE, M. PLANT & J. LITTLE,
supra note 2, at 400-01; COMPENDIUM, supra note 2, at 34-35; supra note 60.
70. See ATIYAH, supra note 46, at 132; 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 8, §§ 18.1-.8,
20.4; H. HART & A. HONORE, supra note 47, at 230-76; Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort,
25 HARv. L. REV. 223, 247-49, 303, 320 (1912).
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expresses. The coverage formula, therefore, is the primary "policy" or
"legal" causation formula in workers' compensation systems.7 1
Courts generally have interpreted the policy limits of the cover-
age formula by applying two concepts: Whether the employee suf-
fered an "accidental injury,'1 72 and whether the injury arose "out of"
the employment. 73 The "accidental injury" concept has provoked in-
tense controversy since the inception of the workers' compensation
system.7 4 Two variations of the concept have evolved. The first posi-
tion, prevalent in the earliest judicial opinions, is that to fulfill the
requirement of "accidental injury," an unusual and unexpected exter-
nal event must have occurred contemporaneously with the injury. In
addition, the worker must have sustained the injury at a definite, rea-
sonably ascertainable time.75 Commentators have criticized the re-
quirement of an unusual and unexpected external event as an artifi-
cial interpretation that courts have applied in order to ensure that a
71. The crucial difference between the method of formulating policy limits into legal for-
mulas under the tort system and under the workers' compensation system is that in the work-
ers' compensation system the legislature defines policy limits. The legislature's statutory direc-
tive, therefore, limits the judiciary's power to formulate policy in workers' compensation cases.
See Malone, The Limits of Coverage in Workmen's Compensation-The Dual Requirement
Reappraised, 51 N.C.L. REv. 705-17 (1973). No such jurisprudential limitation exists under the
tort system: the judiciary is free to formulate whatever policy formulas it desires to limit recov-
ery. In fact, the important critical debates about "duty" and "proximate cause" have centered
on the choice of appropriate formulas to reflect policy considerations. See ATiYAH, supra note
46, at 132-33.
In addition to the coverage formula, legislatures have included secondary policy formulas
in every workers' compensation act. These formulas reflect a legislative intent to define explic-
itly the character of risks to which the system applies. The most apparent example of secon-
dary policy formulas is the "occupational disease" provision, which appears in various forms in
every state act. See 1A A. LARSON, supra note 2, §§ 41.00-.20. Historically, occupational disease
provisions developed because "the concept of accidental injury left substantial gaps in the pro-
tection afforded disabled workers." Id.; see 1A A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 41.31. For a discus-
sion of the accidental injury concept, see infra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
Other examples of secondary policy formulas include statutory provisions relating to her-
nias, see, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 418.401(c) (1978); hearing loss, see, e.g., Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 102.555 (West 1974), N.Y. WORK. CoMP. LAW § 3A (McKinney 1965); radiation disease,
see, e.g., NEv. REv. STAT. § 617.455 (1981); and silicosis, see, e.g., IowA CODE ANN. § 85A.13
(West 1946). Michigan has enacted a specific statutory provision relating to mental disability.
MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 418.301(2), 401(c) (Supp. 1980-81) (as amended by 1980 Mich. Pub.
Acts 357, §§ 301(2), 401(c)). For a discussion of this approach, see infra notes 233-35 and ac-
companying text.
72. See infra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
73. See infra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
74. See 1A A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 37.20; W. MALONE, M. PLANT & J. LITTLE, supra
note 2, at 231-53; COMPENDIUM, supra note 2, at 181; Bohlen, A Problem in the Drafting of
Workmen's Compensation Acts, 25 HARv. L. REv. 328, 337 (1912).
75. See 1B A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 37.20; W. MALONE, M. PLANT, & J. LITTLE, supra
note 2, at 235-36, 242-44.
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factual causation relation exists between employment and the in-
jury.76 The second position states that plaintiffs satisfy the "acciden-
tal injury" requirement if the result of the injury is unexpected or
develops gradually over a substantial period of time. 7 This approach,
which commentators favor and which a majority of jurisdictions have
adopted, does not limit recovery to traumatically caused injuries.78 As
a result of the majority position, decisionmakers in workers' compen-
sation cases address policy and factual causation controversies within
the context of the arise-out-of employment requirement, the second
concept that courts use to identify the policy limitations of coverage
formulas.
79
The objective of the arise-out-of employment requirement is to
determine which risks are employment related.80 If the risk that
causes the injury is not related to employment, the injury is not com-
pensable under the workers' compensation system.8 1 Methodologi-
cally, the requirement directs the trier of fact or an appellate court to
examine the character of the risk that caused the claimant's injury.
82
The vague and essentially "noncommunicative" nature of the
arise-out-of employment requirement renders it vulnerable to judicial
interpretation. Not surprisingly, the judiciary has developed an
elaborate definitional analysis of the concept. Courts have attempted
76. "It would seem that much of the difficulty [in interpreting the accident requirement]
could be avoided by a judicial recognition that the real issue presented in these cases is one of
factual causation." W. MALONE, M. PLANT, & J. LrrrLE, supra note 2, at 238; see P. BARTH,
supra note 2, at 105-07; 1B A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 38.81.
77. See 1B A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 37.20; W. MALONE, M. PLANT, & J. LITTLE, supra
note 2, at 235-36, 242-44; COMPENDIUM, supra note 2, at 181-82.
78. See 1B A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 37.20; W. MALONE, M. PLANT, & J. LITTLE, supra
note 2, at 235-36, 242-44; COMPENDIUM, supra note 2, at 181-82.
79. See 1 A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 6.00; Malone, supra note 71, at 711-19; supra note 71
and accompanying text.
80. See COMPENDIUM, supra note 2, at 182-83.
81. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
82. See Malone, supra note 71, at 711-19; supra note 70 and accompanying text.
The in-the-course-of employment requirement removes from consideration injuries that re-
late to employment through some spatial or temporal connection. See 1 A. LARSON, supra note
2, § 14.00; COMPENDIUM, supra note 2, at 183. The in-the-course-of employment inquiry, there-
fore, is not primarily or focally a causation inquiry. Its analysis, however, inexorably relates to
the arise-out-of employment requirement. See 1A A. LARSON, supra note 2, §§ 29.00-.10; Ma-
lone, supra note 71, at 719-20, 728. Consequently, some courts have adopted a "positional risk"
doctrine, which states that a work related causal connection exists when a claimant's employ-
ment requires him to be at his particular place of employment at a particular time, and, while
there, he suffers an injury due to an act of God or an unprovoked assault. See 1 A. LARSON,
supra note 2, § 10.00; COMPENDIUM, supra note 2, at 183; Malone, supra note 71, at 722. For a
discussion of the importance of the in-the-course-of employment requirement in mental disabil-
ity cases, see infra note 101 and accompanying text.
83. See Malone, supra note 71, at 706-11.
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in this analysis to answer the arise-out-of employment inquiry by
classifying the injury causing risk as a compensable employment risk,
a noncompensable personal risk,"' or a noncompensable neu-
tral risk.8"
2. Factual Causation
Unlike the common law of accidental injury, which recognizes a
separate prima facie element for the cause-in-fact determination, 8
workers' compensation acts expressly state only legal or "policy" cau-
sation formulas.8 7 Factual causation inquiries, however, implicitly un-
derlie the policy inquiries.88 Factual causation issues arise at two
stages of the administrative trial process in workers' compensation
claims. First, the trier of fact must decide the facts to establish the
time, place, and other circumstances attendant to the claimant's in-
jury. This inquiry is basic to the trial process because before the trier
of fact can apply the appropriate policy formula, the claimant must
present him with sufficient facts to demonstrate that the formula is
applicable to the claim. Second, the trier of fact must determine
whether the established facts satisfy the policy formula requirements
for allowing recovery. This second step requires that a factual causal
connection exist between the employee's work and the disabling
injury.89
The determination whether the facts satisfy the coverage
formula is analogous to the factual causation inquiry in common-law
personal injury actions.90 This inquiry is more difficult than the pro-
cess of factfinding because the trier of fact must base its decision
entirely on probabilities."1 Moreover, the trier of fact usually cannot
determine the issue whether the employment caused the disabling in-
jury by factual probabilities that are grounded in common experi-
ence. Consequently, the administrative trier depends almost exclu-
sively upon medical testimony at this stage of the factfinding
84. A noncompensable personal risk arises from an individual's needs, desires, habits, pri-
vate life, or personal bodily or mental deficiencies. Id. at 720; see 1 A. LARSON, supra note 2, §§
11.20-.23, 12.00-.35; COMPENDIUM, supra note 2, at 183.
85. A noncompensable neutral risk is one that is neither employment related nor charac-
teristically related to the injured person. See 1 A. LARSON, supra note 2, §§ 10.00-.33d, 11.30-
.39; COMPENDIUM, supra note 2, at 183; Malone, supra note 71, at 720.
86. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 8, § 20.2; Malone, supra note 2, at 60.
87. See supra notes 62 & 71 and accompanying text.
88. See 13 W. MALONE & H. JOHNSON, supra note 2, § 251.
89. Id.
90. See supra notes 46-57 and accompanying text.
91. See 13 W. MALONE & H. JOHNSON, supra note 2, § 251.
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The judicial formulation of the standard of factual proof neces-
sary to establish causation also serves to measure whether medical
probabilities substantively satisfy the policy formula requirements."
Courts have described this standard utilizing a range of verbal for-
mulas - most aptly a "preponderance of probabilities."9' The "pre-
ponderance" measure has roots in the central policy of the workers'
compensation system: by adopting this standard a court implicitly
declares that an injury is not employment related if the employment
has not factually caused the injury in a more-probable-than-not
sense. Thus, an injury that does not comport to this standard is
outside the policy ambit of the system.
9 5
An administrative trier's factual causation determination is sub-
ject to judicial review if an erroneous application of the appropriate
standard of law has occurred during the administrative trial process.
A factual causation determination is conclusive and not subject to
review if "substantial" evidence supports it.96 When a factual deter-
mination has roots primarily in legal or policy considerations, a court
potentially may review the determination as one that contains an er-
roneous question of law. 7 A court also may reverse the administra-
tive finding on the ground that the trier of fact relied upon insub-
92. "Though medical testimony is sometimes useful on the question of corroborating the
occurrence of the accident itself. . . ,its primary role relates to this question of causal connec-
tion between alleged injurious event and resulting disability." 13 W. MALONE & H. JOHNSON,
supra note 2, § 256; see infra notes 94-95 and accompanying text. Although in compensation
award cases concerning common physical industrial injuries, administrative law judges may not
require expert testimony in proving the "causal connection between an employment event and
[a] disabling mental condition ... expert psychiatric or psychological opinion establishing the
connection is virtually essential to a claimant's success." 13 W. MALONE & H. JOHNSON, supra
note 2, § 262; see 3 A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 79.54.
93. See 3 A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 80.33; W. MALONE, M. PLANT, & J. LITTLE, supra
note 2, at 278-81.
94. Jacobs v. Kaplan, 56 N.J. Super. 157, 152 A.2d 145 (1959). As Professors Malone,
Plant, and Little have observed:
The nature of the burden of proof has been described in a variety of terms. There is
general agreement that it is not necessary for claimant to prove the causation to absolute
certainty. But beyond that point descriptions of the degree of proof that is required vary
in their terminology. A common expression of the standard of proof is that the case must
be proved by the 'preponderance of the evidence' or by the 'fair weight of the evidence.'
Another mode of expression is that the evidence must demonstrate a 'reasonable
probability.'
W. MALONE, M. PLANT, & J. LITrLE, supra note 2, at 279 (citations omitted).
95. For an analysis of the relation among mental injuries, factual causation, and the pur-
pose of the workers' compensation system, see infra notes 224-28 and accompanying text.
96. 3 A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 80.10; see 2 F. COOPER, STATE AnMINISTRATIVE LAW 722-
29 (1965); 4 K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29.01 (1958 & Supp. 1976).
97. F. COOPER, supra note 96, at 665-67; see K. DAVIs, supra note 96, §§ 16.09-.10.
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stantial proof." Appellate courts have utilized these standards
functionally either to grant judicial review and to remedy decisions
that the appellate court believed were improper, or to deny judicial
review and to affirm the administrative trier's legal choices."9 This




1. Physical Impact and Physical Injury Cases
The causation issues in workers' compensation mental disability
cases have centered on the accidental injury and arise-out-of employ-
ment requirements. The personal injury concept also has assumed a
unique technical relevance. 10 1 These issues have arisen in the analysis
of certain fact patterns. 10 2 In one recognized fact pattern, a mental
98. F. COOPER, supra note 96, at 734-37; see K. DAvis, supra note 96, §§ 29.05-06; L.
JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 605-16 (1965).
99. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
100. See infra notes 205 & 208 and accompanying text.
101. For a general discussion of the accidental injury and arise-out-of employment re-
quirements, see supra notes 72-85 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the technical
relevance of the personal injury concept in mental disability cases, see 1B A. LARSON, supra
note 2, § 42.00.
The in-the-course-of employment inquiry-which requires a temporal and spatial nexus
between a claimant's injury and his employment-has not been a source of contention in
mental disability cases. To satisfy the arise-out-of employment requirement in a mental disabil-
ity case, a claimant must prove that employment connected stimuli caused his disability. This
allegation inexplicitly asserts that the mental disability was related temporally and spatially to
the employment. Defendants rarely deny the spatial or temporal occurrence of an employment
connected stimulus or stimuli. Instead, they focus on whether the claimant's mental injury is a
personal injury, whether the stimulus or stimuli that allegedly caused the mental disorder con-
stituted an accidental injury, or whether the mental injury arose out of the employment. The
in-the-course-of employment requirement, in effect, becomes superfluous to these other techni-
cal issues. See Comment, Workmen's Compensation Awards, supra note 2, at 1144. For a dis-
cussion of the analytical relationship between the arise-out-of employment and in-the-course-of
employment requirements, see supra note 75.
102. Professor Larson has categorized "mental and nervous injury" cases in his analysis of
litigation on the meaning of "injury":
The cases may be thought of, for convenience, in three groups: mental stimulus caus-
ing physical injury; physical trauma causing nervous injury; and mental stimulus causing
nervous injury. It must be understood that this use of such words as mental, nervous,
emotional, stimulus, psychic, and the like is only a rough expedient adopted in order to
sort out an almost infinite variety of subtle conditions and relationships for compensation
law purposes, and especially in order to narrow down the range of situations where contro-
versy seems to persist.
1B A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 42.20; see Mental and Nervous Injury, supra note 2, at 1244-45.
This categorization has attained relatively widespread critical recognition. See, e.g., 13 W. MA-
LONE & H. JOHNSON, supra note 2, § 235; W. MALONE, M. PLANT, & J. LITTLE, supra note 2, at
263-65; COMPENDIUM, supra note 2, at 199-200; Lesser & Kiev, supra note 2, at 245-50; Render,
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disorder 03 that allegedly results from a "physical" stimulus disables
a worker. The physical stimulus-which the employment environ-
ment generates and which has an impact upon the worker-either
directly results in a mental disorder or causes a physical injury that
brings about a mental disorder.
An issue arising from this fact pattern is whether the personal
injury concept requires a disabling "physical" injury. Courts uni-
formly have held that a mental injury which implicates the existence
of a physical impact stimulus or a physical injury satisfies the per-
sonal injury requirement. 10' The analogy to negligence cases concern-
ing mental injuries is obvious. The existence of an objective, trau-
matic, work connected physical impact or injury provides an intuitive
guarantee that the mental disorder is genuine and that the employ-
ment genuinely caused it. 105
supra note 2, at 288; Deziel v. Difco Labs., 403 Mich. 1, 22, 268 N.W.2d 1, 9 (1978); Townsend
v. Maine Bureau of Pub. Safety, 404 A.2d 1014, 1016-17 (Me. 1979); Pathfinder Co. v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 62 Ill. 2d 556, 564-65, 343 N.E.2d 913, 917-18 (1976); Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay &
Curr Co., 36 N.Y.2d 505, 509, 330 N.E.2d 603, 605, 369 N.Y.S.2d 637, 641 (1975).
Professor Larson's category of cases in which "mental stimulus causes physical injury"
raises definitional issues that are relevant to possible solutions to the causation question in
mental injury cases. For a discussion of these issues, see infra notes 233-35, 237, & 246 and
accompanying text.
103. As Professor Larson stated, the cases concern mental disorders of "almost every con-
ceivable kind of neurotic, psychotic, depressive, or hysterical symptom, functional overlay, or
personality disorder. .. ." 1B A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 42.22.
104. See, e.g., Employers' Ins. Co. v. Wright, 114 Ga. App. 10, 150 S.E.2d 254 (1966)
(emotional trauma caused by rape at gunpoint found compensable); City of Chicago v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 59 Ill. 2d 284, 319 N.E.2d 749 (1974) (mental injury resulting from pulled muscle
sustained while swinging sledge hammer found compensable); Ladner v. Higgins, Inc., 71 So. 2d
242 (La. App. 1954) ("post-traumatic neurosis" resulting from employee's fall from scaffold
found compensable); Redfern v. Sparks-Withington Co., 353 Mich. 286, 91 N.W.2d 516 (1958)
("conversion reaction" caused when 20 pound steel weight struck employee found compensa-
ble); Hartman v. Cold Spring Granite Co., 243 Minn. 264, 67 N.W.2d 656 (1954) (neurosis with-
out any discernable physical cause, which developed after series of work related accidents
found compensable); Edmonds v. Kalfaian & Son, 9 A.D.2d 551, 189 N.Y.S.2d 456 (1959)
(mental disorder that developed nine years after work related arm amputation held compensa-
ble); Dill Prods. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 42 Pa. Commw. 563, 401 A.2d 409
(1970) (mental and physical disability caused by work related foot injury found compensable);
Greenville Finishing Co. v. Pezza, 81 R.I. 20, 98 A.2d 825 (1953) (traumatic neurosis resulting
from loss of employee's eye suffered while removing cap of fire extinguisher held compensable);
Imperial Knife Co. v. Calise, 80 R.I. 428, 97 A.2d 579 (1953) (employee unable to perform light
work due to fear complex that developed after employee suffered severe finger fractures and
lacerations from operation of power press held compensable); see 1B A. LARSON, supra note 2, §
42.22; W. SCHNEIDER, 5 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 1411 (1946).
105. See 1B A. LARSON, supra note 2, §§ 42.23-.23a; Mental and Nervous Injury, supra
note 2, at 1251, 1253; supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
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2. Mental Stress Cases
A more troublesome fact pattern concerns claimants who suffer
mental disabilities that allegedly result from nonphysical work con-
nected stimuli. Like the physical impact or injury situation, this fact
pattern also raises the issue whether the personal injury concept re-
quires a physical injury. When a physical impact stimulus causes a
mental disorder, a court can perceive the injury as physical because it
possesses a physical dimension. When an injury does not include a
physical element, however, the policy issues underlying recovery for
mental disorders-the genuineness of the injury and the genuineness
of the causal relation between the employment and the disor-
der1° 6 -become more apparent.
Although a minority of courts have denied recovery in these
cases the distinct majority grant compensation at the threshold in
mental disability cases that concern nonphysical-or "mental"
-work connected stimuli. 10 7 The technical justification for the mi-
nority view has been that the "personal injury by accident" concept
mandates that disabling mental injuries have a physical dimension to
them.105 The majority of courts, on the other hand, have interpreted
106. See supra notes 4, 45, 47, 51, & 57 and accompanying text.
107. See 1B A. LARSON, supra note 2, §§ 42.23-.23(b).
108. Perhaps the leading case supporting the minority view is Jacobs v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 196 Kan. 613, 412 P.2d 986 (1966), in which the court concluded that claimant did
not sustain a "personal injury by accident" when the mental disorder resulted from the con-
flicting demands of management and union coemployees. For a further discussion of the case,
see Note, Workmen's Compensation-The Compensability of Injuries From Psychic
Trauma-Who's Afraid of Wolfe?, 25 U. KAN. L. REv. 158, 168 (1976). In Sawyer v. Pacific
Indem. Co., 141 Ga. App. 298, 233 S.E.2d 227 (1977), the court found that claimant, who be-
came "acutely psychotic" after working with emotionally disturbed youngsters for two years,
had not suffered a compensable personal injury under the workmen's compensation statute.
The court noted, however, that it properly could consider the claim under Georgia's occupa-
tional disease statute. Id. at 302, 233 S.E.2d at 231. For further discussion of this alternate
statutory remedy, see infra note 214 and accompanying text. In Vernon v. Seven-Eleven Stores,
547 P.2d 1300 (Okla. 1976), the court, citing Jacobs, held that a mental injury induced by
claimant's submission to a polygraph test was not a compensable personal injury. See Erhart v.
Great W. Sugar Co., 169 Mont. 375, 546 P.2d 1055 (1976) (claimant's mental and physical
breakdown, which resulted from animosity directed at him for installing electrical system that
would replace many employees' jobs held not compensable personal injury); Daugherty v. ITT
Continental Baking Co., 558 P.2d 393 (Okla. 1976) (claimant who sustained mental injury after
surprise inspection and severe criticism by supervisors did not suffer a compensable personal
injury).
Other courts have relied on statutory language that requires "harm to the physical struc-
ture of the body" to deny compensation for mental injuries. See, e.g., City Ice & Fuel Div. v.
Smith, 56 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 1952) (claimant who received no physical injury but experienced
fright in traffic accident and developed mental disability denied compensation under statute
defining "injury" to exclude "a mental or nervous injury due to fright or excitement only");
Bekelski v. O.F. Neal Co., 141 Neb. 657, 4 N.W.2d 741 (1942) (claimant elevator operator who
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the "personal injury by accident" requirement differently. One line of
decisions has not imposed threshold limitations on recovery for
mental injury when the fact pattern concerns a sudden, traumatic
mental impact-usually the fright or shock that a worker experiences
in an isolated, work related event. Courts have justified these deci-
sions technically by emphasizing the accidental injury concept rather
than the personal injury concept. The occurrence of an unexpected
and temporally definite mental impact has allowed courts easily to
characterize the injury as accidental. 109 Policy justifications have re-
suffered mental disability after being trapped with man-who had been crushed by the elevator,
did not suffer statutorily defined "personal injury"). But see Lyng v. Rao, 72 So. 2d 53 (Fla.
1954) (claimant who was working with feet on wet floor when lightning struck, which resulted
in mental injury, suffered compensable injury). The Louisiana courts never have found that a
purely mental incident produces a compensable injury. For a comprehensive analysis of Louisi-
ana's treatment of mental trauma resulting in disabling mental injury, see 13 W. MALoNE & H.
JOHNSON, supra note 2, §§ 217, 235.
109. See, e.g., Pathfinder Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 62 Il1. 2d 556, 563, 343 N.E.2d 913,
917 (1976) (claimant aided employee whose hand was severed in punch press; "sudden severe
emotional shock traceable to a definite time, place and cause which causes psychological injury
or harm [is] an accident within the meaning of the [Workmen's Compensation] Act, though no
physical trauma originally was sustained"); Fitzgibbons' Case, 373 N.E.2d 1174, 1177 (Mass.
1978) (claimant suffered acute anxiety reaction and later committed suicide after employee
died while carrying out his orders; a compensable "personal injury" includes "cases involving
mental disorders or disabilities causally connected to mental trauma or shock," but holding
limited to cases in which single traumatic event occurred); Simon v. R.H.H. Steel Laundry, 25
N.J. Super. 50, 95 A.2d 446, afl'd, 26 N.J. Super. 598, 98 A.2d 604 (1953) (violent steampipe
explosion held compensable accident); Peters v. New York State Agricultural & Indus. School,
64 A.D. 2d 749, 406 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1978) (violent disruption in training home for delinquent
boys in which claimant-supervisor received threats but no physical injury held compensable
accident); Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 36 N.Y.2d 505, 330 N.E.2d 603, 369 N.Y.S.2d
637 (1975) (claimant discovered supervisor's body after he committed suicide; neither foresee-
ability nor physical impact necessary; held compensable accident); Burlington Mills Corp. v.
Hagood, 177 Va. 204, 13 S.E.2d 291 (1941) (claimant frightened by electrical flash of short
circuit held compensable accident). For further discussion of Wolfe, see 1B A. LARSON, supra
note 2, § 42.23(a); Note, supra note 108; Comment, Workmen's Compensation-Compen-
sability of Mental Injury, 21 N.Y.L.F. 465 (1976). For further discussion of Pathfinder, see 1B
A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 42.23(a); Comment, Recovery for Nervous Injury, supra note 2.
Courts have awarded compensation in mental impact mental disability cases even when the
statutory definitions of "injury" seem preclusive. Bailey v. American Gen. Ins. Co., 154 Tex.
430, 279 S.W.2d 315 (1955), is among the most noteworthy decisions in light of the Texas stat-
ute's restrictive definition of "injury" as "damage or harm to the physical structure of the
body." The Texas court circumvented the statute's narrow definition by viewing a body's
"physical structure" as an entire, interrelated organism, which included mental aspects, not
just bones and tissues. For a further discussion of the case, see 1B A. LARSON, supra note 2, §
42.23(a). A recent line of Texas cases has refused to apply the Bailey reasoning to mental stress
cases in which a mental impact has not occurred. See, e.g., Transportation Ins. Co. v. Maksyn,
580 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. 1979) (mental disability caused by 42 years of stressful work not compen-
sable); University of Tex. Sys. v. Schieffer, 588 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (mental disa-
bility caused by stressful working relationship with supervisor held not compensable); Jackson
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 580 S.W.2d 70 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (truckdriver who normally drove
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inforced the accidental injury emphasis. First, medical science has
discredited the judicial belief that the presence of "some shred of the
'physical'" assured the genuineness of the injury and the causal rela-
tion.110 Therefore, a rule that "allows an award for a claimant . . .
who is suffering from psychological disabilities caused by an often
minor physical injury but denies an award to a claimant with a simi-
lar psychological disability brought about . . . by a sudden, severe
emotional shock and who fortuitously did not sustain any physical
injury in his accident" furthers illogical and invalid policy.11 Second,
courts have found a mental impact stimulus resulting from a sudden,
specific, employment related mental event sufficiently reliable to as-
suage a court's policy apprehensions." 2
Another, more controversial, line of cases has addressed a fact
pattern in which the mental stimuli that allegedly cause a mental
disability result from gradual employment pressures.1 ' Courts con-
fronting the technical and policy problems in these cases have taken
various approaches. For example, in Jose v. Equifax, Inc.,"4 in which
claimant allegedly suffered a mental disability as a result of "a tre-
mendous amount of pressures and tension" from his employment ob-
large trucks 10-12 hours a day, five days a week, suffered a heart attack while doing paperwork;
held not compensable). For further discussion of the Texas approaches to mental disabilities,
see Comment, The Compensability of Mentally Induced Occupational Diseases under Texas
Workers' Compensation Law, supra note 2.
Other states have relied on the Bailey reformulation of the statutory phrase "physical
structure of the body" to reject the dichotomy between mind and body and to allow recovery.
See, e.g., Todd v. Goostree, 493 S.W.2d 411 (Mo. App. 1973) (mental disability caused by emo-
tional shock compensable under statute defining "injury" as "violence to the physical structure
of the body").
110. See, e.g., Pathfinder Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 62 Ill. 2d 556, 561, 343 N.E.2d 913,
918 (1976); Mental and Nervous Injury, supra note 2, at 1260.
111. 62 Ill. 2d at 64-65, 343 N.E.2d at 917; see also Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co.,
36 N.Y.2d 505, 510, 330 N.E.2d 603, 606, 369 N.Y.S.2d 637, 642 (1975) ("There is nothing talis-
manic about physical impact.").
112. See Townsend v. Maine Bureau of Pub. Safety, 404 A.2d 1014, 1018 (Me. 1979).
113. See 1B A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 42.23(b). These cases create more apprehension
about fraudulent claims and the genuineness of the causal relation between employment and
the mental injury than do cases in which the plaintiff alleges that the causal stimulus is a
traumatic mental impact. To some extent courts can measure objectively shock or fright when
these conditions result from temporally and spatially definite employment events. Nonimpact
mental stresses-the gradual stresses of employment-are no more subjective than mental
stress that results from an identifiable traumatic event. A discernible objective event, however,
a "badge of reliability," is not present when the alleged causal mental stimuli are gradual. Their
subjective nature, therefore, is less visibly susceptible to objective measurement. Triers fear
fraud and malingering even though the actual injury may be identical to the injury that results
from A definite event. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
114. 556 S.W.2d 82 (Tenn. 1977).
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ligations,115 the Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed an administrative
denial of compensation. The court held that although courts had con-
strued the accidental injury requirement to encompass the unex-
pected causal effect of an alleged work related stimulus, the require-
ment "still does not embrace every stress or strain of daily living or
every undesirable experience encountered [in] employment."' 18 The
court also implied that without this threshold limitation, claimants
would use the workers' compensation system to seek compensation
for personal nonwork related mental disorders. As a result, the sys-
tem would become a "general, comprehensive health and accident in-
surance" system.1
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Albanese's
Case"8 adopted a different threshold for potential recovery in grad-
ual stress mental disability cases. Albanese worked as a foreman for a
steel company where his duties included the supervision of certain
employee activities. When the plant's employees voted to unionize,
considerable friction developed between Albanese and the workers.
Albanese's job required him continually to relay information to the
workers that would enrage them-for example, the owner's decision
to eliminate overtime and the order that the men must do more
work. After Albanese had heated discussions with the workers, how-
ever, the owner rescinded his unpopular decisions. After one tumul-
tuous exchange, Albanese became distressed, developed chest pains,
sweatiness, shortness of breath, headaches, and depression. Doctors
diagnosed his disabling condition as "a chronic anxiety state mixed
with depression and somatized reaction and ... neurocirculatory
asthenia."'119
The court perceived that the issue in Albanese was whether
claimant suffered a personal injury under the Massachusetts Act.12 0
The court reversed the appeals board decision, which had denied re-
covery as a threshold matter of law. The board apparently had based
its decision on an earlier state supreme court opinion, Begin's
Case."' The holding in Begin's Case was limited, however; in that
case, the emotional disturbance that an employee sustained as a re-
sult of stressful employment over a three and one-half year period
115. Id. at 83.
116. Id. at 84.
117. Id.
118. 389 N.E.2d 83 (Mass. 1979).
119. Id. at 85.
120. Id. at 84.
121. Id. at 86 n.3.
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was not a personal injury under the Massachusetts Act.12 2 In Alba-
nese, on the other hand, the court stated that the board's findings
revealed that claimant's injury resulted from "a series of identifiable
stressful work related incidents occurring over a relatively brief pe-
riod of time" - not from ordinary general employment stresses.
12 3
These factual findings brought claimant within the standard adopted
in Fitzgibbon's Case,1 24 which the court had decided after the board's
decision. In Fitzgibbon's Case the court declared that mental disabil-
ities caused by mentally traumatic events arising out of employment
were technically within the personal injury requirement.1 2 5 Fitzgib-
bon's Case further described a mentally traumatic event as "stress
greater than the ordinary stresses of everyday work. '' M The "greater
than ordinary" stresses that Albanese suffered, therefore, were suffi-
cient to satisfy the personal injury requirement.
12 7
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin directly confronted the thresh-
old policy limitations in gradual stress mental disability cases in
School District No. 1 v. Department of Industry, Labor & Human
Relations.12 8 Claimant in School District No. 1 was a high school
guidance counselor. The school's student council placed a list of rec-
ommendations in her school mailbox, requesting the removal of sev-
eral staff members and other changes. The counselor's copy of this
list was difficult to read, and she did not learn until the following
day, after questioning students, that the list recommended her re-
moval from the staff. The counselor became emotionally upset about
this recommendation; she was unable to sleep or eat and suffered
nausea, severe headaches, and acute anxiety. The counselor alleged
that the incident with students had caused her condition, which doc-
tors diagnosed as a "'severe tension state with gastrointestinal signs
and symptoms.' ",129
The court began its analysis by declaring that the Wisconsin
Workers' Compensation Act clearly did not intend to limit recovery
122. 354 Mass. 594, 596, 238 N.E.2d 864, 866 (1968).
123. Albanese's Case, 389 N.E.2d at 86.
124. Id.
125. 373 N.E.2d 1174, 1177 (Mass. 1978); see supra note 109 and accompanying text.
126. 373 N.E.2d at 1177 (Mass. 1978); see supra note 109 and accompanying text.
127. Albanese's Case, 389 N.E.2d at 86. The court did not elaborate on the policy dimen-
sions of its decision. For an excellent discussion of compensation for mental disability in Mas-
sachusetts, see Note, When Stress Becomes Distress: Mental Disabilities Under Workers'
Compensation in Massachusetts, supra note 2.
128. 62 Wis. 2d 370, 215 N.W.2d 373 (1974).
129. Id. at 371, 215 N.W.2d at 374.
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to physical injuries and traumatically caused mental injuries.13 0 The
analysis then shifted to the Act's accidental injury requirement. The
court recognized that the claim would satisfy the accident require-
ment if the employee did not expect the cause or effect of the in-
jury. 3 1 The court emphasized, however, that it had not defined the
requirement to encompass "every occurrence or event which befalls
the employee." 132 Like the Tennessee court in Jose,'3 3 the Wisconsin
court feared that without any definitional limit to the accidental in-
jury requirement, the workers' compensation system might become a
social insurance system. The danger of malingering and the difficulty
of proving a causal relation between the employment and the mental
disorder in mental injury cases intensified this fear.'3 Referring to
the limiting elements in tort actions for mental injuries intentionally,
recklessly, or negligently caused,3 5 the court concluded that "some
effective means of evaluating [a] claim of mental injury" in workers'
compensation cases was necessary."3 ' Accordingly, the court adopted
a standard under which mental injuries that did not result from
trauma must arise from "a situation of greater dimensions than the
day-to-day emotional strain and tension which all employees must
experience. '' s7 Applying this test, the court denied claimant compen-
sation on the ground that her experience "could not be deemed" dif-
ferent from "the countless emotional strains and differences that em-
ployees encounter daily without serious mental injury.' '1
s
3
The Supreme Court of Arizona established a similar standard in
130. "It is clear that the legislature intended to impose liability against the employer for
mental and physical injuries which are caused by accident or disease." The court relied on §
102.01 of the Wisconsin Workmen's Compensation Act, which defines "'injury'" as "'mental
or physical harm to an employee caused by accident. . . .'" 62 Wis. 2d at 373, 215 N.W.2d at
375-76 (court's emphasis). The court added: "Similarly, it is clear that the legislature did not
intend to limit the employer's liability for mental injuries solely to those which are traumati-
cally caused. There is no statutory language limiting liability for mental injury in such a man-
ner and none may be inferred." Id. at 373-74, 215 N.W.2d at 375 (footnotes omitted).
131. Id. at 374, 215 N.W.2d at 376.
132. Id.
133. See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
134. Id. at 376, 215 N.W.2d at 376-77.
135. Id. at 376-77, 215 N.W.2d at 377. For a general discussion of the principles to which*
the Wisconsin court referred, see supra notes 39-57 and accompanying text.
136. School Dist. No. 1 v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 62 Wis. 2d at
377, 215 N.W.2d at 377.
137. Id.
138. Id. The Wisconsin court expressly affirmed and applied the School Dist. No. I
threshold standard in Swiss Colony v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 72
Wis. 2d 46, 240 N.W.2d 128 (1976). Swiss Colony also raised the issue of the appropriate causa-
tion standard in mental disability cases. See infra note 165 and accompanying text.
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Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. Industrial Commission13 and Sloss
v. Industrial Commission.'" In Fireman's Fund claimant's mental
disability allegedly resulted from constant, psychologically intolera-
ble work responsibility. Focusing on the accident requirement, the
court held that the disability had unexpectedly affected her.141 In
Sloss the court elaborated on the Fireman's Fund standard. Claim-
ant in Sloss was a highway patrolman who suffered from a condition
that doctors diagnosed as "chronic anxiety. '142 Claimant alleged that
his condition developed from the pressures of his work. The adminis-
trative law judge, without the benefit of Fireman's Fund, had denied
recovery because the "stresses to which [claimant] was exposed in his
employment were [the] same as, and no greater than, those imposed
upon all other highway patrolmen in [the] same type of duty. 1 43 The
Arizona Supreme Court approved this decision, adding that under
Firemen's Fund the accident concept necessitated a showing of more
than ordinary and usual work related stress.
1 44
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine in Townsend v. Maine
Bureau of Public Safety1 45 expressly adopted the Wisconsin ap-
139. 119 Ariz. 51, 579 P.2d 555 (1978).
140. 121 Ariz. 10, 588 P.2d 303 (1979) (reh. denied).
141. Claimant in Fireman's Fund was an underwriter for defendant's insurance agency.
Within a short time of her arrival, the agency experienced a period of explosive growth. Claim-
ant, "a conscientious employee and a perfectionist," undertook duties that placed her "under
constant pressure." Id. In April 1975 defendant agency purchased another agency and added
another employee. The agency made claimant the supervisor of the new employee and gave her
responsibility for merging the books of the two agencies. Claimant began to feel "frustrated and
ineffective" and "experienced difficulty relating to her co-workers. . . ." Id. at 52-53, 579 P.2d
at 556-57. After a severe emotional outbreak, she was hospitalized for "neurotic depression, or a
mental breakdown." Id. at 53, 579 P.2d at 557.
Claimant alleged that she suffered a "disabling mental condition brought on by the gradual
buildup of the stress and strain of her employment." Id. The agency argued that the injury was
not compensable because "there must be an unexpected injury-causing event accompanied by a
physical impact or exertion" to satisfy the Arizona Act's accident requirement. The Arizona
Supreme Court rejected defendant's argument and affirmed the decision of the Arizona Court
of Appeals in Brock v. Indus. Comm'n, 15 Ariz. App. 95, 486 P.2d 207 (1971). The court of
appeals in Brock had held that "purely excessive emotions, unaccompanied by physical force
or exertion" could form the basis of a compensable accident under the Arizona Act. Id. at 96,
486 P.2d at 208 (emphasis in original). Similarly, the Fireman's Fund court found that claim-
ant's disability-"the result of the delegation to her of excessive responsibilities [which] re-
suited in the unexpected, her mental breakdown. .. "--was "sufficiently unanticipated to be
called 'unexpected' and hence, accidental . . . " Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 119 Ariz. 51, 53, 579 P.2d 555, 557 (1978).
142. 121 Ariz. 10, 10, 588 P.2d 303, 304 (1979) (reh. denied).
143. Id., 588 P.2d at 303-04.
144. Id. at 11, 558 P.2d at 304.
145. 404 A.2d 1014, 1019 (Me. 1979).
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proach in School District No. 1.146 Unlike the Wisconsin and Arizona
courts, however, the Maine court did not base its decision on the ac-
cident requirement. Instead, the court expressly stated the policy
reason for its adoption of the limiting threshold standard: "a higher
threshold level than simply the usual and ordinary pressures that ex-
ist in any working situation would erect an appropriate buffer be-
tween the employer and a host of malingering claims.
147
The Maine court's analysis reveals the underlying methodology
of the Wisconsin and Arizona approaches: to counterbalance the pol-
icy problems that emanate from the subjective nature of mental inju-
ries by providing a method of objective measurement. The Oregon
Court of Appeals in James v. State Accident Insurance Fund recog-
nized this methodological attempt in its accurate restatement of the
Wisconsin and Arizona approaches: a claimant who suffers a mental
disability cannot receive compensation as a threshold matter of law if
the alleged causal stimuli do not result from an employment environ-
ment "unusual or excessive to the point that the average worker
would experience an adverse emotional reaction."14
3. Rejection of Threshold Limitations
A distinct minority of jurisdictions do not impose any threshold
limitations in mental disability cases,149 and instead view mental dis-
146. 62 Wis. 2d 370, 215 N.W.2d 373 (1974); see supra notes 158-67 and accompanying
text.
147. 404 A.2d at 1019. In addition, the court reiterated the Wisconsin Supreme Court's
argument in School Dist. No. I that "[this standard] would also serve to filter out a sufficient
number of cases so that an employer would not be thrust into the role of a general in-
surer. . . ." Id. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the relevance of
this policy argument in mental disability cases, see infra note 221 and accompanying text.
148. James v. State Accident Ins. Fund, 44 Or. App. 405, 410, 605 P.2d 1368, 1370 (1980).
The Oregon court, however, did not adopt this threshold standard. Id. at 411, 605 P.2d at 1371.
See infra note 149 and accompanying text. Professor Larson has endorsed the Wisconsin-Ari-
zona-Maine threshold approach. See 1B A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 43.23(b).
149. See, e.g., Baker v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 18 Cal. App. 3d 852, 96
Cal. Rptr. 279 (1971); Royal State Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Labor & Indus. Relations Appeals Bd., 53
Hawaii 32, 487 P.2d 278 (1971); Yocum v. Pierce, 534 S.W.2d 796 (Ky. 1976); Townsend v.
Maine Bureau of Pub. Safety, 404 A.2d 1014 (Me. 1979); Carter v. General Motors, 361 Mich.
577, 106 N.W.2d 105 (1960); University of Pittsburgh v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd.,
49 Pa. Commw. 347, 405 A.2d 1048 (1979).
In James v. State Accident Ins. Fund, 44 Or. App. 405, 605 P.2d 1368 (1980), the Oregon
Court of Appeals held that claimants who suffer mental injury from ordinary, gradual mental
stress are compensable under the occupational disease provision of the Oregon Act. The court,
however, emphasized that the technical distinction between an accidental injury and occupa-
tional disease has little import in Oregon. Id. at 409, 605 P.2d at 1370. Instead, the central
technical issue-regardless whether the claimant views his mental disability as an accidental
injury or occupational disease-is "whether claimant has proven the causal nexus between the
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abilities as analytically identical to physical disabilities. 150 The first
court that adopted this approach was the Supreme Court of Michi-
gan in Carter v. General Motors.5 ' Claimant in Carter worked on a
hub assembly job at defendant's automobile manufacturing plant.
Claimant's work required him to take an assembled hub from a table
to his workbench, "remove burrs with a file, . . . grind out holes in
the assembly with a drill, and place the assembly on a conveyor
belt. 1 52 Claimant could not "keep up with the pace of the job unless
he took two assemblies at a time to his workbench."153 His foreman,
however, repeatedly instructed him against this because the assembly
parts became mixed on the conveyor belt. Although claimant at-
tempted to keep up with the job for fear of layoff if he failed, he
continued to fall behind the pace and to mix up the assembly parts.
Consequently, his foreman continued to berate him. As a result of
disease and the work place." Id. The Georgia Court of Appeals also has allowed recovery for
mental disabilities caused by ordinary, gradual mental stress under its general coverage occupa-
tional disease statute. See Sawyer v. Pacific Indem. Co., 141 Ga. App. 298, 233 S.E.2d 227
(1977); supra note 108 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the analytical effect that the
Oregon and Georgia approaches have on mental disability cases, see infra note 214 and accom-
panying text.
150. In Townsend v. Maine Bureau of Pub. Safety, 404 A.2d 1014 (Me. 1979), the Maine
Supreme Judicial Court added the alternative requirement that "ordinary work-related stress
and strain could be compensable if it [is] shown by clear and convincing evidence that the
trauma generated by the employment predominated in producing the resulting injury." Id. at
1019-20 (emphasis added). For a discussion of the analytical effect of this standard of proof on
mental disability cases, see infra note 205 and accompanying text. The Maine court, accord-
ingly, has adopted a tiered approach to mental disability cases:
[W]here there is a sudden mental injury precipitated by a work-related event, our typical
workers' compensation rules will govern .... Where, however, the mental disability is the
gradual result of work-related stresses, the claimant will have to demonstrate either that
he was subjected to greater pressures and tensions than those experienced by the average
employee or, alternatively, by clear and convincing evidence show that the ordinary and
usual work-related pressures predominated in producing the injury.
Id. For additional discussion of the Maine approach, see supra notes 145-47 and accompanying
text.
151. 361 Mich. 577, 106 N.W.2d 105 (1960). The Carter opinion has received extensive
critical attention. See 1B A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 42.23(b); 13 W. MALONE & H. JOHNSON,
supra note 2, § 235; Brill, supra note 2, at 312-15; Downing, Workmen's Compensation, 8
WAYNE L. REV. 272, 277 (1962); Joseph, supra note 2, at 1103-07, 1124-30; Lesser & Kiev, supra
note 2, at 249; Loria, supra note 2, at 901; Manson, supra note 2, at 384; Mental and Nervous
Injury, supra note 2, at 1252; Render, supra note 2, at 297; Robitscher, supra note 2, at 195-96,
250-53; Sadoff, Civil Law and Psychiatry: New Dimensions, 56 A.B.A. J. 165, 168 (1970);
Seizer, supra note 2, at 955-56; Spenser, supra note 2, at 714-17; Note, Workman's Compensa-
tion-Psychosis Resulting From Daily Assembly Line Pressures, 21 LA. L. REv. 868 (1961);
Case Comment, Workmen's Compensation-Disabling Psychosis Caused by Emotional Pres-
sures of Assembly Line Held a Compensable Injury Under State Workmen's Compensation
Act, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 1185 (1961).
152. 361 Mich. 577, 580, 106 N.W.2d 105, 107 (1960).
153. Id. at 580, 106 N.W.2d at 107.
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the employment dilemma, claimant suffered an emotional collapse
diagnosed as paranoid schizophrenia and a residual type schizo-
phrenic reaction.1
5 4
The issue that the court expressed in Carter was whether a
mental disability is compensable when the injury allegedly is caused
by "emotional pressures not . . . unusual . . . in any respect,-that
is, not shown . . . to be any different from the emotional pressures
encountered by .. . fellow workers in similar employment.' 155 The
court concluded that Michigan law did not compel limiting recovery
in a mental injury case to fact situations in which the claimant suf-
fered a single physical injury or a single mental shock.15 The court
added that injuries sustained by gradual, accidental, mental stimuli
satisfy the accidental injury requirement and, therefore, were com-
pensable. 157 The court then granted claimant recovery because the
factual record revealed that his disability arose out of the pressures
of his work.' 58
The Carter court articulated as the policy rationale for its con-
clusions that the basic purpose of the workers' compensation system
compelled that a worker disabled as a result of a work related mental
injury receive identical treatment to a worker disabled by a work re-
lated physical injury. 59 All courts that have adopted the Carter ap-
proach have advocated the same rationale either implicitly or
expressly.10
4. The Arise-Out-Of Employment Inquiry
The determination whether a mental injury has arisen out of and
in the course of a claimant's employment is central to mental disabil-
154. Id. at 581, 106 N.W.2d at 107.
155. Id. at 585, 106 N.W.2d at 109.
156. Id. at 593, 106 N.W.2d at 113. The Michigan Supreme Court had been one of the
first courts to refuse to limit recovery in a mental disability case in which a mental impact
allegedly caused the mental injury. See Klein v. Len H. Darling Co., 217 Mich. 485, 187 N.W.
400 (1922) (mental disability that resulted in claimant's death caused by shock claimant exper-
ienced when he dropped register from second floor and hit an employee who was rendered
unconscious).
157. 361 Mich. 577, 592-93, 106 N.W.2d 105, 113 (1960).
158. Id. at 593, 106 N.W.2d at 113.
159. Id. at 580, 106 N.W.2d at 106.
160. See, e.g., Baker v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 18 Cal. App. 3d 852, 861-
62, 96 Cal. Rptr. 279, 286 (1971) ("[A] disabling [physical] injury may be the result of the
cumulative effect of each day's stresses and strains. We perceive no logical basis for a different
requirement for a psychoneurotic injury. To one experiencing it, such an injury is as real and as
disabling as a physical injury." (citations omitted)); Royal State Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Labor & In-
dus. Relations Appeals Bd., 53 Hawaii 32, 38, 387 P.2d 278, 282 (1971).
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ity cases.16 Whereas the in-the-course-of employment inquiry as a
practical matter is relatively unimportant,"6 2 courts focus upon the
technical and policy problems of the arise-out-of employment
inquiry.
Courts generally have recognized-consistent with present medi-
cal knowledge-that an individual's personal psychological disposi-
tion in part causes employment related mental injuries. Accordingly,
courts have interpreted the arise-out-of employment requirement to
account for this element of personal susceptibility.1 6 3 This interpreta-
tion arises from the axiom in workers' compensation law that em-
ployers must take employees as they are-with their personal bodily
and mental deficiencies.16 4 Therefore, the appropriate arise-out-of
employment inquiry in mental disability cases is whether the work-
ers' employment aggravates, accelerates, or combines with his per-
sonal mental disposition to produce his disability. 6 5 The claimant
161. See 1 A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 12.20; 1B A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 42.23(c); supra
notes 73 & 80-85 and accompanying text.
162. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 84 and accompanying text; infra note 165 and accompanying text.
164. See 1 A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 12.20.
165. See id.; 1B A. LARSON, supra note 2, §§ 42.22-.23(c).
When risks personal to an employee arguably contribute to an alleged work related injury,
the axiom that employers must "take employees as they are" directly affects the risk analyses
that courts utilize to interpret the arise-out-of employment requirement. The employment risk
necessary to bring the injury within the ambit of the workers' compensation system effectively
is found when the employment contributes to the injury in a more-probable-than-not factual
sense.
Dr. Smith has argued perceptively that in psychic injury cases the nature of the medico-
legal problem compels both parties to argue for a causation standard that takes into account
the plaintiff's preexisting disposition toward mental disturbance. Counsel for a plaintiff must
realize that:
Plaintiff must capitalize on the legal doctrine that "the wrongdoer takes his victim as
he finds him" and cannot have a mitigation of damages because he is more vulnerable as
the result of preexisting disease, disability, or impairment. .. . He should realize that it
will be disastrous if he claims primary causation and the defendant proceeds to prove that
the plaintiff had a preexisting disease or impairment. In such cases, it is much better for
the plaintiff to bring out the prior impairments of health and to be content with a theory
of aggravation. This conforms to scientific reality and may still eventuate in a substantial
award.
Smith, Problems of Proof, supra note 8, at 597, 622 (footnotes omitted). A defendant's counsel
must respond to the plaintiff's approach by arguing:
[A]ny particular set of signs and symptoms... may be due to various alternative
causes not associated with the accident sought to be incriminated. They may be due to a
number of organic, functional or psychological diseases having no relationship to trauma
or they may be consequences of prior accidents and impairments in no way caused by
defendant.
Id. at 599 (footnotes omitted).
The Wisconsin Supreme Court apparently adopted a different causation standard for
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must meet this standard, which courts consider a factual determina-
tion,' by a "preponderance of probabilities."' 6 7 Thus, a claimant
may obtain judicial review of an administrative decision only if the
administrative factfinder has applied the standard erroneously or has
based the decision on insubstantial evidence.1
6 8
Courts frequently have utilized the arise-out-of employment in-
quiry to deny compensation in cases in which claimants have satis-
fied judicially imposed threshold limitations.6 9 The principles of ap-
pellate review underlie these denials. In opinions reversing
administrative findings that allowed compensation, courts have ap-
plied an "aggravate, accelerate, or combine with" standard and have
found the weight of the evidence insubstantial because the claimant's
mental disabilities in Swiss Colony, Inc. v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 72
Wis. 2d 46, 240 N.W.2d 128 (1976). In an earlier opinion, Lewellyn v. Department of Indus.,
Labor & Human Relations, 38 Wis. 2d 43, 155 N.W.2d 678 (1968), the court had adopted the
principle that when "a definitely preexisting condition of a progressively deteriorating nature"
exists, an injury is compensable if the employment "precipitates, aggravates and acccelerates
[the condition] beyond normal progression." Id. at 59, 155 N.W.2d at 687. In Swiss Colony the
court found no indication that claimant-who suffered a disability diagnosed as psychotic
schizophrenia--"had previously suffered any kind of mental disease or debility" and deter-
mined, therefore, that the Lewellyn aggravation requirement did not apply to the facts of the
case. 72 Wis. 2d at 54, 240 N.W.2d at 132. The court then upheld the administrative factual
finding that the "stresses and strains of [claimant's] employment caused her severe mental
disability." Id. at 56, 240 N.W.2d at 133 (emphasis added). This statement clearly implies that
the existence of a factual causal relation between the claimant's mental injury and her employ-
ment is necessary in mental disability cases. The practical difference between this causation
requirement and the requirement that employment must aggravate or accelerate a mental disa-
bility is difficult to discern.
166. Professor Larson has concluded:
[I]n practice most of the problems in this area are medical rather than legal....
[D]enials of compensation in this category are almost entirely the result of holdings that
the evidence did not support a finding that the employment contributed to the final result.
Whether the employment aggravated, accelerated, or combined with the internal weakness
or disease to produce the disability is a question of fact, not law, and a finding of fact on
this point by the commission based on any medical testimony. . . will not be disturbed on
appeal.
1 A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 12.20 (footnotes omitted). See also 1B A. LARSON, supra note 2, §
42.23(c).
167. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court
has imposed a stricter standard of proof in gradual, ordinary mental stress mental disability
cases. See supra note 150 and accompany text. The Louisiana Court of Appeals, which has
limited recovery in mental disability cases to physical impact fact patterns, also has suggested a
stricter standard. See Victoriana v. Orleans Parish Bd., 346 So. 2d 271 (La. 1977) (plaintiff
must prove mental injury as any other injury; factfinder must proceed with utmost caution and
exercise extreme care). For a discussion of the policy effect of stricter proof standards in mental
disability cases, see infra note 205 and accompanying text.
168. See 1 A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 12.20; supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
169. See 1B A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 42.22 n.79.10; supra note 164 and accompanying
text.
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
subjective predisposition to the injury-not his employment-caused
the injury in a more-probable-than not or "substantial" sense.
17 0
Courts also have utilized this procedural technique in jurisdic-
tions that do not impose threshold limitations in mental disability
cases. The Michigan Supreme Court, which was the first court to re-
ject threshold limitations,1 71 decided the most dramatic set of cases
exemplifying the use of the aggravate, accelerate, or combine with
concept with interpretation of the arise-out-of employment standard
in the appellate review process. In 1975, and again in 1978, after re-
mand, the court decided Deziel v. Difco Laboratories, Inc., Bahu v.
Chrysler Corp., and MacKenzie v. Fisher Body Division. The court
consolidated the three cases into one opinion, Deziel v. Difco Labora-
tories, Inc.
172
Claimant in Deziel handled chemical test tubes in defendant's
laboratory. She dropped a test tube, which caused glass to fly into
her eye; several months later she dropped another test tube filled
with iodine, which splattered around her eyes. After the second acci-
dent, claimant became disabled by pain in the back of her eyes, anxi-
ety, headaches, tiredness, and nausea-allegedly as a result of the
two work incidents. 173 Claimant in Bahu worked at a stamping ma-
chine in defendant's plant, a job that required him to lift and move
fifteen hundred seven pound parts a day from an overhead conveyor.
He claimed that his job caused various strains, traumas, and pres-
sures which resulted in a functional disability to his neck, back, and
shoulder.17 4 In MacKenzie claimant suffered from a disabling psycho-
neurotic condition that he alleged resulted from his employment.
Claimant worked the day shift at defendant's plant; his job was to
count and ship back defective parts to vendors. During the last two
170. See, e.g., Ramonett v. Indus. Comm'n, 27 Ariz. App. 728, 558 P.2d 923 (1976) (reh.
denied) (review denied); Rund v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 213 Kan. 812, 518 P.2d 518 (1974) (reh.
denied); State Highway Dept. v. Hopwood, 331 S.W.2d 900 (Ky. 1970); Gibson v. New Orleans
Pub. School Bd., 352 So. 2d 732 (La. App. 1977); Greene v. Yeager, 222 Md. 411, 160 A.2d 605
(1960); Zobitz v. City of Ely, 219 Minn. 411, 18 N.W.2d 126 (1945); Smith v. Cascade Laundry
Co., 335 S.W.2d 501 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960); Condiles v. Waumbec Mills, 95 N.H. 127, 58 A.2d 726
(1948); Krasinski v. American Brass Co., 12 A.D.2d 827, 209 N.Y.S.2d 335 (1961); Ada Coca-
Cola Bottling Co. v. Snead, 364 P.2d 696 (Okla. 1961) (reh. denied); Quillen v. O.D. Purington
Co., 80 R.I. 165, 94 A.2d 247 (1953); Berndt v. Department of Labor & Indus., 44 Wash. 2d 138,
265 P.2d 1037 (1954); Miller Rasmussen Ice & Coal Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 263 Wis. 538, 57
N.W.2d 736 (1953).
171. See supra notes 151-59 and accompanying text.
172. 394 Mich. 466, 232 N.W.2d 146 (1975) (Deziel I), on remand, 403 Mich. 1, 269
N.W.2d 1 (1978) (Deziel II).
173. 394 Mich. at 470-71, 232 N.W.2d at 148.
174. Id. at 472, 232 N.W.2d at 148-49.
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or three years of his work, claimant, a sixty-five year old retiree, be-
came increasingly irritated and nervous because the afternoon shift
workers occasionally took the defective parts from his department
and installed them in the new cars. Claimant worried about the
safety of the new cars; furthermore he had to work harder, because
he had to recount the remaining defective parts and account to his
supervisors for the missing ones. The stress from this activity alleg-
edly caused his disabling mental condition.
17 5
The Michigan administrative law judges awarded compensation
in all three cases. The appeals board, however, reversed the awards176
on the ground that the injuries did not arise out of the claimants'
employment but out of their personal emotional dispositions. The
board found that a psychiatrist had treated Deziel for the identical
ailments prior to her employment with defendant; Bahu had exper-
ienced a complex emotional cultural disassociation upon coming to
the United States from Iraq; MacKenzie suffered from internal hy-
pochondrial neurosis, which had intensified.
177
On appeal the Michigan Supreme Court declared its uncertainty
whether the appeals board had applied the appropriate arise-out-of
employment standard to each case. Because the board potentially
had applied an erroneous standard, its decisions were subject to re-
view.17 8 The court stated that the appropriate arise-out-of employ-
ment inquiry was the aggravate, accelerate, or combine with stan-
dard. 7 9 The court directly addressed the arise-out-of employment
standard implicit in the decision of the appeals board in MacKenzie.
According to the court, the board in MacKenzie had concluded
through "an objective analysis . . . that an actual mental injury
caused by a claimant's perception of his work environment is not
compensable when that environment is not injurious to the average
workers."' 80 The court found this standard contrary to the court's
analysis in Carter v. General Motors Corp.'8' and ruled that in
mental disability cases "a subjective standard (i.e., the effect of the
perceived work environment on the claimant) is used when determin-
ing whether the injury arose-out-of the employment.' 8 2 The court
175. Id. at 473, 232 N.W.2d at 149.
176. Id. at 471-73, 477-79, 232 N.W.2d at 148-49, 151-52.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 475, 232 N.W.2d at 150.
179. Id. at 475-76, 232 N.W.2d at 150.





then remanded the three cases to the appeals board to apply the ag-
gravate, accelerate, or combine with standard from the subjective
perspective of each claimant.183
On remand the appeals board expressly applied the aggravate,
accelerate, or combine with standard, although not from the subjec-
tive perspectives of the claimants. In Deziel the board held that
claimant had not met the more-probable-than not burden of proof
necessary to satisfy the aggravate, accelerate, or combine with stan-
dard. The board concluded in Bahu that Bahu's employment precipi-
tated his injuries. In MacKenzie the board declared that the disabil-
ity arose from an imagined, internal stimulus that only existed in
claimant's mind. The board concluded, therefore, that it could not
"infer from the facts" that the employment aggravated or accelerated
the disability.
18 4
The Michigan Supreme Court, after remand, reiterated the ap-
propriateness of the Deziel I aggravate, accelerate, or combine with
arise-out-of employment standard. The court reaffirmed and elabo-
rated on the Deziel I holding that the trier of fact should apply the
standard from the claimant's subjective perception of the causal rela-
tion.185 The court declared that a claimant is entitled to compensa-
tion if he "honestly perceives" that his mental disorder occurred dur-
ing his employment, even though his subjective perception of the
cause of the injury might be mistaken.18 The Deziel II court's cen-
tral justification for the "subjective causal nexus" standard was that
mental disabilities are subjective in nature. Thus, an objective arise-
out-of employment standard would not suffice because an objective
inquiry ultimately was indeterminable.' 7 Accordingly, the court re-
183. Id. at 480, 232 N.W.2d at 152.
184. Deziel II, 403 Mich. 1, 13-14, 16-17, 19-20, 268 N.W.2d 1, 4-5, 6, 8 (1978) (after
remand).
185. Id. at 25-26, 268 N.W.2d at 10-11.
186. The court held:
[I]n cases involving mental (including psychoneurotic or psychotic) injuries, once a
plaintiff is found disabled and a personal injury is established, it is sufficient that a strictly
subjective causal nexus be utilized . . . to determine compensability. Under a "strictly
subjective causal nexus" standard, a claimant is entitled to compensation if it is factually
established that claimant honestly perceives some personal injury incurred during the or-
dinary work of his employment "caused" his disability. This standard applies ... even
though [a plaintiff] mistakenly ... believes that he is disabled due to that work-related
injury and therefore cannot resume his normal employment.
Id. at 26, 268 N.W.2d at 11 (emphasis in original).
187. The court noted:
Simply stated, psychoses and psychoneuroses are mental disorders which are rooted in
unconscious mental causes.... [lit is only logical that we employ a subjective standard
in determining whether the claimant's employment combined with some internal weakness
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versed the board's decisions on remand in Deziel and MacKenzie.
ss
V. CRITIQUE
A. The Policy Bases of the Threshold Limitations
In mental disability cases courts have adopted, either implicitly
or expressly, threshold limitations that derive from personal injury or
accidental injury concepts to assure the genuineness of a mental dis-
order in an employment context.8 9 Courts have perceived the several
threshold requirements-that a mental injury result from a physical
impact, a physical injury, a mental impact, or gradual mental stresses
or disease to produce the disability. A subjective standard acknowledges that the claimant
is "mis-manufacturing" or misperceiving reality, otherwise the person would not be a psy-
choneurotic or psychotic by definition.
Id. at 29-30; 268 N.W.2d at 12-13. Moreover, "[a]ny objective causal nexus standard would not
suffice" because
almost all psychoneuroses and psychoses are, to some degree, latent in origin. The claim-
ant's predisposition for such disabilities usually can be traced back to childhood....
Any objective causation standard, whether it be in the form of the "but-for" or the
"aggravation-acceleration" rule, will be of little assistance in deciding whether to award
compensation in cases involving psychoneuroses or psychoses. . . . [In most cases a con-
stellation of psychodynamic factors is involved; therefore, it is almost impossible to weigh
the causal significance of any one factor.
Id. at 27-28, 268 N.W.2d at 11-12.
The court posited two additional justifications for its arise-out-of employment standard.
First, the court found that the precedent established in Carter v. General Motors, 361 Mich.
577, 106 N.W.2d 105 (1960), compelled the "subjective perception" standard. The Deziel II
court observed that in Carter it had upheld the administrative finding that claimant had satis-
fied the arise-out-of employment requirement. The Carter court had based this finding on testi-
mony by an expert witness that claimant "'saw himself in an impossible situation in which he
couldn't win. . . [and] which had no solution.' "Id. at 583, 106 N.W.2d at 108. Accordingly, "a
careful reading of Carter leads to this inescapable conclusion that [this court] employed the
subjective standard in determining whether plaintiff's claimed disability and injury . . . was
compensable." Deziel II, 403 Mich. at 31, 268 N.W.2d at 13. Second, the court found the sub-
jective causal nexus standard justifiable because the arise-out-of employment requirement
"should always be read progressively or liberally," id. at 34, 268 N.W.2d at 15, that is, "'for
compensation."' Id. at 34 n.14, 268 N.W.2d at 15 n.14.
For an analysis of Deziel I & II, see Joseph, supra note 2, at 1108-23, 1130-34; Note, Deziel
v. Difco Laboratories, Inc.: Michigan's Response in Awarding Worker's Compensation Benefits
for Mental Injuries, 1979 DET. C.L. Rav. 173.
188. Id. at 40, 43, 268 N.W.2d at 17, 18.
Although the dissent in Deziel II accepted the majority's analysis of the complex etiology
of mental disorders, id. at 53, 268 N.W.2d at 24 (Coleman, J., dissenting), it argued that be-
cause of this complex etiology, the result of the subjective perception standard would be that
every mentally disabled employee would perceive the cause of his injury as employment re-
lated. Id. at 54, 268 N.W.2d at 24. The dissent proposed an "aggravate, accelerate, or combine
with" arise-out-of employment standard, which the court would apply from the perspective of
an average employee. Id. at 61 n.14, 268 N.W.2d at 27 n.14. The dissent added that this causal
standard "must be established in some substantial degree." Id. at 61, 268 N.W.2d at 27.
189. See supra notes 105, 110-12, 136-38, & 147 and accompanying text.
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"unusual or excessive to the point that the average worker would ex-
perience an adverse emotional reaction"-to provide some objective
measure of the employment's causal contribution to the injury. 90
The policy rationale for these limitations is that they counterbalance
the subjective nonemployment factors that integrally contribute to a
mental disability.191
Courts universally have refused to limit recovery at the threshold
if a physical impact stimulus or a physical injury causes a mental
disability.1 92 A majority of courts, moreover, have extended the
threshold to include a mental disability that results from a mental
impact stimulus.193 The rationale underlying this approach has been
the recognition that medically a "shred of the 'physical'" does not
assure a causal relation between a mental disorder and employ-
ment.19 4 The Massachusetts, Wisconsin, Arizona, and Maine Su-
preme Courts have extended the mental impact threshold even fur-
ther to include gradual mental stresses that result from objectively
determined unusual or excessive employment conditions. 95
The existence of a mental impact stimulus or unusual excessive
mental employment stresses, however, does not medically assure the
genuineness of the causal relation between a worker's mental disabil-
ity and his employment any more than does the existence of a physi-
cal impact. The intensity of the "mental stresses is etiologically irrele-
vant.9 ' The metaphorical description of the threshold limitations by
courts as "sufficient badge[s] of reliability,"' 97 therefore, is accurate:
like the objective criteria in tort actions for emotional injury, these
"badges" at best assure the appearance of an objective causal
relation. 9 8
B. The Policy Bases of the Arise-Out-Of Employment Inquiry
Courts that have rejected threshold inquiries in mental disability
cases have grounded their reasoning on the central purpose of the
workers' compensation system. They have argued that the system
should not treat differently a worker who suffers a mental disability
190. See supra notes 105, 112, 136-38, & 147 and accompanying text.
191. Id.
192. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
193. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
194. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 118-48 and accompanying text.
196. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
197. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court in Townsend v. Maine Bureau of Pub. Safety,
404 A.2d 1014, 1018 (Me. 1979), used this description.
198. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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as a result of traumatic or gradual employment stresses from a
worker who suffers a physical injury because of the same stresses. 19
A claimant should receive compensation if his disabling injury arose
out of his employment-regardless of its physical or mental nature.
Thus, these jurisdictions appropriately locate the causation issue in
the arise-out-of employment standard. Moreover, because claimants
in mental disability cases by definition are subjectively predisposed
to mental injury, the appropriate arise-out-of employment inquiry is
whether the employment aggravated, accelerated, or combined with
the claimant's preexisting susceptibility to produce his disability.2 00
The claimant must satisfy this standard by a preponderance of fac-
tual probabilities. 0 1
A trier's factual determination of the aggravate, accelerate, or
combine with arise-out-of employment standard, however, also con-
tains a policy based evaluation. A trier cannot ascertain the prepon-
derance of factual probabilities without factually assessing the
probabilities in some quantitative or qualitative sense. Yet a complex
interrelation exists between the subjective and environmental reali-
ties that contribute to a worker's disability. This interrelation is
neither quantifiable nor qualifiable; the trier cannot measure respec-
tive causative probabilities of a mental disorder. 02 The trier, there-
fore, inevitably confronts an evaluative dilemma when determining
the aggravate, accelerate, or combine with arise-out-of employment
standard in mental disability cases. A claimant's subjective mental
stresses, his employment stresses, or his nonemployment environ-
mental stresses each quantitatively or qualitatively may have con-
tributed to his disability in a more-probable-than-not sense. Thus, a
trier, consistent with medical knowledge, makes a compensation de-
termination in every mental disability case based on his evaluative
sense of whether employment stresses-rather than personal or
nonemployment stresses-aggravated the claimant's condition in a
more-probable-than-not sense; although employment stresses may al-
ways be an aggravating element,203 the trier is unable to determine
whether the employment aggravation is based on a preponderance of
199. See supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
202. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
203. One commentator has recognized that the Michigan court reached this conclusion in
Carter v. General Motors, 361 Mich. 577, 106 N.W.2d 105 (1960): "Following the logic of Carter
.... all mental illness, neurotic and psychotic, incurred by an employee can be attributed to
job pressure because there is always a history of increasing tensions on the job before any
precipitate outbreak of mental pathology." Robitscher, supra note 2, at 254.
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factual probabilities. 20 4
Moreover, a trier's evaluative determination of the aggravate, ac-
celerate, or combine with arise-out-of employment standard in
mental disability cases allows an appellate court to assert its evalua-
tive preferences through its functional utilization of the principles of
judicial review of administrative decisions. On review an appellate
court can affirm a trier's evaluative decision by holding that it was
factual and, therefore, conclusive. Conversely, a court can make a dif-
ferent evaluative decision by reversing the trier on the implicit
grounds that the trier accorded improper evidentiary weight to either
the contributing subjective and nonemployment factors or to the con-
tributing employment factors. The court, therefore, could reverse the
trier's decision because the trier did not base its conclusions on sub-
stantial evidence or because it applied an erroneous standard of
proof.
205
204. A possible exception to this conclusion is the situation in which an individual suffers
a mental disorder as a direct result of an organic injury to his central nervous system. See
supra notes 19 & 26 and accompanying text for a discussion of organic mental disorders. A
court, however, just as easily could categorize an organic injury to the nervous system as a
"physical"-rather than a "mental"--injury. Therefore, this type of injury arguably would be
outside the "mental disability" category of analysis.
The conclusion that the arise-out-of employment inquiry in mental disability cases inher-
ently is evaluative applies to any disabling injury with an etiology that comprises contributing
personal and environmental factors which are impossible to quantify or qualify. Heart attack
and back injuries are other examples of disabling injuries of unknown etiology. See P. BARTH,
supra note 2, at 80-86. In 1953 Professor Small first noted the evaluative nature of the arise-
out-of employment determination in workers' compensation cases that concerned disabling in-
juries of unknown, unquantifiable etiology. Small, supra note 2; see Malone, supra note 2, at
61-68; Comment, Workmen's Compensation Awards, supra note 2, at 1143-45. Dr. Mitchell has
affirmed this conclusion:
The attempt to allocate percentage values to the [heart attack] patient as compensa-
tion for an acute attack further clouds the picture. Many physicians feel that stress on the
job may have an effect. Certainly the life style of the patient taken as a whole must also
have an effect. How can one decide that this percentage of the workers' condition is due to
his occupation, while that portion is due to other factors? . . . [Workers' Compensation]
boards and physicians are forced into making these value judgments, even though there is
little scientific basis for them.
Mitchell, Some Medical Issues in Workmen's Compensation, in 2 SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES FOR
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 355, 358 (1973) (foot-
notes omitted) (emphasis added).
205. See supra notes 168-71 & 178-83 and accompanying text. The evaluative nature of
the appellate decision essentially does not change when a court adopts a stricter standard of
proof than the preponderance of probabilities standard. A standard similar to the one that the
Maine court advanced-"ordinary work-related stress and strain [is] compensable if it is shown
by clear and convincing evidence that the trauma generated by the employment predominated
in producing the resulting injury," Townsend v. Maine Bureau of Pub. Safety, 404 A.2d 1014,
1019-20 (Me. 1979)-indicates an evaluative decision because the trier of fact still must con-
front a factual determination that is impossible to measure in probability terms. For a discus-
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The Michigan Supreme Court did not recognize the evaluative
policy based underpinnings of the arise-out-of employment issue in
its landmark Deziel I and Deziel II opinions,206 although the deci-
sions of both the court and the appeals board contained an evaluative
dimension.20 7 In Deziel I the court utilized appellate review princi-
ples to examine the appeals board's denial of compensation in Deziel,
Bahu, and MacKenzie. Uncertain whether the board had applied the
aggravate, accelerate, or combine with arise-out-of employment test,
the court found a potentially erroneous application of the appropri-
ate legal standard. 08 The court also stated that the board should ap-
ply this standard from the subjective perspectives of the individual
claimants.209 Under this interpretation the board had to give deter-
minative evidentiary weight to the contributing subjective elements
of the claimants' mental disabilities. On remand in Deziel and Mac-
Kenzie the appeals board made an evaluative determination that the
claimants did not prove that their employment aggravated their
mental disabilities in a more-probable-than-not sense.210 In Deziel II
the court reasserted the applicability of the subjective arise-out-of
employment test. The court argued that medical knowledge com-
pelled use of the standard because mental disabilities are essentially
subjective. The court rejected an objective standard because of the
medical impossibility of measuring the causal significance of an em-
ployment event.2 1
The Deziel II approach, however, clearly does not conform to
medical knowledge because it does not take into account the integral
contribution of employment stress to an employee's mental injury.
Mental disorders occur as a consequence of a psychogenic and psy-
chodynamic relationship between an individual's subjective self and
his environment, including his employment.21 2 Furthermore, the im-
possibility of weighing the etiological elements in mental disability
cases also arises when the trier attempts to measure the causative
contribution of the claimant's subjective perceptions. In actuality,
sion of the Maine standard, see supra text accompanying notes 192-95. Moreover, a "clear and
convincing evidence" or "predominate cause" standard would not lessen the appellate court's
functional ability to insert its evaluative choice of the causative elements of an alleged work
related mental disability.
206. Joseph, supra note 2, at 1130-34.
207. Id. at 1133.
208. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
209. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 185-87 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
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the Deziel 11 court based its standard not on medical knowledge, but
on an admitted policy preference for "[c]ompensation for [mental]
disability. . . over any subsidiary doubts about the existence of an
objective causal nexus.2
213
The ramifications of the policy based determinations that under-
lie the arise-out-of employment inquiry in mental injury cases compel
two conclusions. First, in jurisdictions that have rejected policy based
threshold limitations, a trier and an appellate court must make an
evaluative decision when determining the arise-out-of employment
inquiry.21 4 Second, in those jurisdictions that impose threshold limi-
213. Deziel II, 403 Mich. at 35, 268 N.W.2d at 15. See Joseph, supra note 2, at 1131-32;
supra note 187 and accompanying text.
214. Three state courts have held that the triers of fact can make the policy or legal
causation inquiry in mental disability cases pursuant to their state statutes' "general coverage"
occupational disease provisions. In Sawyer v. Pacific Indem. Co., 141 Ga. App. 298, 233 S.E.2d
227 (1977), the Georgia Court of Appeals declared that claimant's psychosis arguably was an
occupational disease. The court remanded the case to the Georgia Medical Board-which the
state had established by statute to resolve occupational disease claims-to apply Georgia's stat-
utory standards for occupational disease: "[that a] causal condition [exists] between the work
and the disease, following exposure occurring by reason of employment, with no substantial
exposure outside employment; that (the disease] is not an ordinary disease of life to which the
general public is exposed; that [the disease] had its origin in a risk connected with the employ-
ment. . . ." Id. at 302-03, 233 S.E.2d at 231. See supra note 108 for a discussion of the facts in
this case.
In James v. State Accident Ins. Fund, 44 Or. App. 405, 605 P.2d 1368 (1980), the Oregon
Court of Appeals held that the state can compensate a claimant's anxiety and depressive neuro-
sis as an occupational disease. The court affirmed claimant's compensation award after apply-
ing the Oregon Supreme Court's test to determine the compensability of an occupational dis-
ease related to a preexisting condition: a claimant must "prove by a preponderance of evidence
that (1) his work activities and conditions (2) caused a worsening of his underlying disease (3)
resulting in an increase in his pain (4) to the extent that it produces disability or requires
medical services." Id. at 411-12, 605 P.2d at 1371. The court expressly rejected defendant's
contention that the court should analyze claimant's disability "in terms of the accidental injury
portion of the Workers' Compensation Act." Id. at 408-09, 604 P.2d at 1370.
Claimant in Martinez v. University of Cal., 93 N.M. 455, 601 P.2d 425 (1979), developed a
cancerous growth on his eye following exposure at his work to radioactive materials. After sur-
gical removal of the growth, he suffered an extreme, disabling anxiety neurosis that manifested
itself as a phobia of radioactive exposure. The New Mexico Supreme Court held that his injury
was actionable as an occupationl disease. Although the statute required that an occupational
disease be "peculiar to" the occupation, the court stated that claimant needed to show only a
"'recognizable link' between [this] disease and some distinctive features of his job." Id. at 457,
601 P.2d at 427.
These cases illustrate the different judicial attitudes that exist toward the legal causation
inquiry under "general coverage" occupational disease provisions. These provisions "require the
courts to distinguish between occupational diseases and 'ordinary diseases of life.'" W. MA-
LONE, M. PLANT, & J. LrrrLE, supra note 2, at 258. They usually define the term "occupational
disease" to "include any disease arising out of exposure to harmful conditions of the employ-
ment, when those conditions are present in a peculiar or increased degree by comparison with
employment generally." 1A A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 41.00. Thus, analytically, when a disease
is "so obviously related to conditions peculiar to the industrial activity of the employer, ...
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tations, policy decisions occur at two stages: at the threshold level
and, if the threshold is satisfied, at the arise-out-of employment
inquiry.
C. The Policy Issues
The subjective dimension of mental disorders creates policy ap-
prehensions that permeate judicial attitudes toward mental injuries
in both the tort and workers' compensation systems. 15 A fundamen-
tal jurisprudential difference, however, distinguishes the two systems.
Under the common law, courts essentially have unlimited power to
establish loss-shifting formulas that expressly reflect policy choices.
These policy based formulas develop within the procedurally defined
domains of the judge and the jury. The trial process, therefore, as-
similates the policy decisions in mental injury cases as it does other
common-law policy based determinations."' 6
Under workers' compensation systems, the system's central pol-
icy compromise between worker and employer limits a court's op-
tions. On the one hand, the system compels an employer to pay com-
pensation benefits for disabling injuries only if the injuries result
from employment related risks that the legislature has defined. On
the other hand, an employee may receive benefits only if such a risk
caused his disabling injury. The primary statutory embodiment of
this policy is the arise-out-of employment inquiry, in which the trier
there is not much trouble in bringing [it] within the scope of the statutory definition." W.
MALONE, M. PLANT, & J. LrrILE, supra note 2, at 258. See supra note 71 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the legal causation dimension of "general coverage" occupational disease
provisions. When a claimant suffers a disease that is fairly common to ordinary life-such as a
mental disorder-the analytical process is complicated:
The courts are torn between the statutory injunction that diseases of ordinary life are not
to be covered and the realization that in fact the disease involved was a definite risk of the
employee's job. . . .If the risk of contracting the ailment is greater than that to which the
general public is subjected and the causation is reasonably certain, [courts are] likely to
rule that the disease is compensable.
W. MALONE, M. PLANT, & J. LTTLE, supra note 2, at 258. If a court chooses to utilize a compen-
sation statute's occupational disease provision to determine the causation issue in mental disa-
bility cases, the judicial decision still will rest on an evaluative decision. The analytical key to
determining the applicability of an occupational disease case will be the clear presence of a
factual causal relationship between the disability and the employment. Because it is impossible
to prove a causal relationship in mental disability cases, a trier and an appellate
court-through the traditional review process-necessarily will engage in evaluative decision-
making. The ultimate analytical result, therefore, is no different from the result when the trier
applies the arise-out-of employment inquiry.
215. See supra notes 38, 45, 51, 57, 105, 106, 112, 134, & 147 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 53 & 56 and accompanying text.
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decides whether a risk is employment related.211
The most pronounced policy justification for the threshold limi-
tations that courts impose in workers' compensation mental disabil-
ity cases and mental injury tort actions is the need to assure the
causal genuineness of the injury.21 8 These objective limitations, how-
ever, do not medically assure genuineness: at best, they assure an ap-
pearance of genuineness.1 9
Although the "appearance of genuineness" justification clearly is
within a court's common-law policy making power,220 this rationale
and the threshold approaches that emanate from it are inherently
repugnant to the central legislative policy of the workers' compensa-
tion system. Under the threshold approaches a court may deny bene-
fits to a mentally disabled employee if his injury did not arise from
physical or mental stimuli with the "appearance of genuineness," al-
though the claimant may have suffered a genuine employment re-
lated mental disability from gradual, ordinary employment stresses.
Equally repugnant to the system's policy is the rationale that thresh-
old limits are necessary to prevent the workers' compensation system
from becoming a social insurance system.22 '1 This argument relies on
the premise that mentally disabled claimants who cannot satisfy the
threshold limitations have not suffered genuine work related mental
disorders and, therefore, will not receive benefits. The effect of
threshold limits, instead, is potentially to deny benefits to claimants
who genuinely may have suffered work related mental injuries that
did not result from physical impact, mental impact, or unusual, ex-
cessive mental stresses.
The threshold limitations in mental disability cases, therefore,
reflect policy choices that potentially frustrate the purpose of the
workers' compensation system. These limitations can create a class of
claimants that is underinclusive: a claimant who has suffered a work
related mental disability may not receive benefits if the stimuli caus-
ing his injury do not satisfy the threshold requirements. The physical
impact approach denies recovery to a mentally disabled claimant
whose injury may have arisen from acute or chronic nonphysical
stimuli induced by an employment event.2 2 The mental impact ap-
proach disallows compensation when gradual mental stimuli may
217. See supra notes 60 & 80-81 and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 52 & 196 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 117 & 132-34 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
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have caused the mental disability.223 The objective unusual or exces-
sive stress approach denies benefits to claimants when ordinary daily
employment stresses may have created the mental disorder.2"'
The arise-out-of employment inquiry, essential in every mental
injury case under workers' compensation, arises from evaluative, pol-
icy based decisions, because the necessary factual causal relation be-
tween employment under an "aggravate, accelerate, or combine with"
arise-out-of employment standard is impossible to prove in a more-
probable-than-not sense. The factual causation inquiry in mental in-
jury tort actions-an inquiry that is assimilated analytically into the
judge-jury decisionmaking process-also is evaluative in nature."25 In
workers' compensation mental disability cases, however, the evalua-
tive factual causation inquiry frustrates the system's central purpose.
Because the administrative trier cannot factually determine the cause
of mental injuries in a more-probable-than-not sense, the trier's deci-
sion must reflect an evaluative policy preference for or against com-
pensation.226 If the trier is favorable toward compensation, its deci-
sions may create an overinclusive class of beneficiaries: some
claimants may receive compensation who may not be entitled to ben-
efits because their employment did not in a more-probable-than-not
sense aggravate their susceptibility to a mental disability. If the
trier's evaluative preference is against compensation, its decision po-
tentially creates an underinclusive group of claimants; some claim-
ants who may deserve compensation because their employment more-
probably-than-not aggravated their susceptibility to a mental disabil-
ity may not receive benefits. The system then shifts the same evalua-
tive decisions to the appellate court through the appellate review
process.227
The inevitable conclusion is that judicial approaches to work re-
lated mental disabilities reflect policy choices that potentially frus-
trate the central legislative purpose of workers' compensation sys-
tems. Although the legislature has effected a compromise between
workers and employers that grants benefits to employees if their inju-
ries are related to their jobs, standards of review that rely inherently
upon evaluative judgments result in a class of claimants that is either
223. See supra notes 104-49 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 150-60 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 46-57 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 203-04 and accompanying text.
227. See supra note 205 and accompanying text. This conclusion also applies when courts
adopt a stricter standard of proof in mental disability cases. Id.
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under or overinclusive.22 s Consequently, workers' compensation
mental disability cases proceed within a profound analytical and pol-
icy dilemma.
VI. SOLUTIONS
A court or legislature that confronts the causation issue in work-
ers' compensation mental disability cases-or, by analogy, workers'
compensation actions concerning other diseases of unknown etiology
such as cardiovascular and back related disabilities-must recognize
that regardless of technical or policy justification, any approach to
the issue potentially frustrates the legislative purpose of the workers'
compensation system.229 Therefore, under one approach to the issue,
a legislature or court could exclude mental disabilities and other
work related illnesses with unknown etiologies from the coverage of
workers' compensation systems.2 30 A mentally disabled employee's
exclusive redress thus would be against.his employer or coemployees
using applicable mental injury tort principles. 23 1 In support of this
decision a court could argue that the judiciary must not engage in a
process of statutory interpretation that forces it potentially to frus-
trate the legislative purpose of the statute.3 2 Furthermore, a court
228. The problem of over and underinclusion can arise in jurisdictions that administer
their workers' compensation systems through the judicial process. Although the policy and fac-
tual causation inquiries in mental disability cases occur in these jurisdictions within the appro-
priate procedural domains of a judge and jury, the causation determinations, nevertheless, are
bottomed on evaluative decisions. In these jurisdictions a judge or a jury and an appellate court
that is bound by civil procedural principles makes the evaluative decisions, rather than an ad-
ministrative trier and an appellate court. The ultimate substantive effect is the same in either
process. For a discussion of the administrative structure of workers' compensation systems, see
supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 215-28 and accompanying text.
230. See P. BARTH, supra note 2, at 278-79. Professor Barth argues:
The problems raised by the ways the various state systems have grappled with the
tough issues of etiology are so great that a policy of status quo cannot be defended. Basic
changes should be made that explicitly confront the issues of unknown etiology. Those
diseases whose etiology is unknown should not be coered in the manner that currently
prevails in most states. For courts or juries [in workers' compensation cases] to decide
etiological matters when science does not have any answers creates an unacceptable bur-
den for them and necessarily results in capricious decisions.
Id. at 278. Professor Barth concludes that cardiovascular disabilities-which, like mental inju-
ries, "cannot yet be linked scientifically to the workplace"-"should be dropped from [workers'
compensation] coverage." Id. at 278-79.
231. This approach would have the collateral advantage of eliminating a difficult and con-
troversial issue of emerging importance in workers' compensation law. whether the remedy for a
mental disability allegedly caused by the intentional misconduct of an employer should be ex-
clusive to the workers' compensation or tort system. For an analysis of this issue, see 2A A.
LARSON, supra note 2, § 68.34.
232. See J. BENTHAM, OF LAws IN GENERAL, ch. XIV (H.L.A. Hart ed. 1970); James, Indi-
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could contend that the common-law judge-jury decisionmaking pro-
cess is a much more appropriate forum for resolving the distributive
issues that arise out of mental disability cases than is the administra-
tive and appellate structure of the workers' compensation system.133
If the legislature decides to exclude mental disabilities from coverage
under the workers' compensation system, its act also would imply
that the common-law process is the correct forum in which to resolve
viduation of Laws, in BENTHAM AND LEGAL THEORY (M. James ed. 1973). A court, of course,
could choose to engage in an interpretation of the statute and take an arguably interventionist
position. For a discussion of this alternative judicial approach, see infra notes 238-46 and ac-
companying text.
233. Application of the distributive principles underlying enterprise insurance reveals
that the consumer of the product will bear the ultimate cost of mental injuries, regardless
whether the workers' compensation or tort system is the decisionmaking body. Liability insur-
ance initially will absorb the cost of the injuries under the tort system; workers' compensation
insurance will do the same under workers' compensation systems. In both instances this ex-
pense will pass horizontally into the mhrketplace in the form of an increased price of the prod-
uct and will spread among ultimate consumers. Whether employers can pass the increased cost
on to consumers will depend upon a variety of circumstances, including the employers' monop-
oly position, growth rate, stage of development, competitive position, and flexibility of output,
demand, and resource supply. See Calebresi, supra note 15.
Using the tort system to compensate mental injuries will make the policy roles of the judge
and the jury much more important than they are under the present system. The full effect of
the factual and policy causation issues inherent in every potential work related mental injury
action then will fall upon the tort system. The ultimate administrative burden then might be
substantial enough to compel the legislature to respond directly to the issue. For a discussion of
legislative approaches to mental injuries, see infra notes 234-37 and accompanying text.
A profound jurisdictional problem would arise if the judiciary were to exclude mental inju-
ries from the workers' compensation system. A workers' compensation administrative trier or a
trial court initially would have to decide whether an employee suffered a "mental disabil-
ity"---which would give the claimant jurisdiction to proceed in tort against an alleged wrong-
doer-or a "physical disability"-which jurisdictionally would make the claimant's exclusive
remedy a workers' compensation claim. Since the distinction between a "mental" and a "physi-
cal" injury is medically spurious, see supra note 25 and accompanying text, the administrative
trier or the trial court would have to engage in an evaluative threshold definitional decision.
Arguably, the judicial decision to exclude mental disabilities from the workers' compensation
system merely would shift the evaluative problem from the causation issues to the threshold
definitional issue.
One response to this argument is to have a trial court decide the jurisdictional question as
a matter of law. Another, more theoretical, answer is that the policy effect of an evaluative
threshold definitional decision is different from the policy effect of the evaluative causation
decision because the latter does not directly conflict with the legislative quid pro quo. The
determination instead is a secondary policy inquiry required only after the courts have made
the primary policy decision to adopt an approach to mental disabilities in accord with the legis-
lative purpose of the workers' compensation system.
The attempt generically to classify an injury as "mental" or "physical" has proved analyti-
cally troublesome and undoubtedly will remain so. For a discussion of the potential analytical
ramifications of the mental/physical distinction, see Joseph, supra note 2, at 1134-36, 1138-39.
For a discussion of the impact of the definitional-jurisdictional problem on other approaches to
the mental disabilities causation issue, see infra notes 234, 237, & 246 and accompanying text.
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the distributive issues that arise in mental disability cases.3 4
Under a different approach to the causation issue, a legislature
could define a causation standard, or a more specific standard of
proof for mental disabilities.3 5 The decision would reinforce the leg-
islative intent to resolve the distributive considerations within the
administrative and benefit structure of the workers' compensation
system. This legislative approach, of course, would preempt the judi-
ciary from excluding mental disabilities from the workers' compensa-
tion system. 8 Several problems, however, potentially arise. First, a
legislative standard unequivocally must indicate the legislative policy
preference either "for" or "against" compensation. An ambiguous
standard would force the administrative trier to engage in essentially
the same evaluative inquiry that it already pursues in its interpreta-
tion of the arise-out-of employment formula. Second, even if the ad-
ministrative trier believes that its evaluative choice is in accord with
the intent of a legislature's mental disability provision, the choice
still will shift to the appellate court level under the guise of the find-
ings of fact-question of law distinction. The ultimate decision
whether the mental disability provision applies, therefore, will re-
main vulnerable to the evaluative position of the appellate court.37
234. The broad jurisdictional question whether the legislature or the judiciary is best
suited to make the exclusion decision is beyond the scope of this Article. See R. KEETON, supra
note 12, at 3-24, 147-68. The mental/physical threshold jurisdictional issue also would arise if
the legislature made the exclusion decision.
235. The Michigan Legislature has adopted this approach. The statutory language appli-
cable to mental disabilities under the Michigan Act provides:
Mental disabilities and conditions of the aging process, including but not limited to heart
and cardiovascular conditions, shall be compensable if contributed to or aggravated or
accelerated by the employment in a significant manner. Mental disabilities shall be com-
pensable when arising out of actual events of employment, not unfounded perceptions
thereof.
1980 Mich. Pub. Acts 357, §§ 301(2), 401(c), amending MICH. Coin. LAWS ANN. §§ 418.301(1),
(2), .401(c) (Supp. 1980-81). For a comprehensive analysis of the statutory provision, see Jo-
seph, supra note 2, at 1134-46.
236. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
237. See Joseph, supra note 2, at 1145-48. A third problem would be the mental/physical
threshold jurisdictional issue. Id. at 1138-39.
The legislature alternatively might address the mental disability causation issue by requir-
ing that the trier apportion an employee's mental disability award according to the perceived
proportion of employment related contribution. Drs. Smith and Solomon have recommended
this approach. See Smith & Solomon, supra note 2, at 138-47. Another way to implement the
apportionment concept is to establish a second injury fund, which would make the employer
"ultimately liable only for the amount of disability attributable to the particular injury occur-
ring in his employment, while the fund pays the difference between that amount and the total
amount to which the employee is entitled for the combined effects of his prior and present
injury." 2 A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 59.31(a).
Both legislative approaches, however, would retain the coverage formula as the primary
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If a legislature does not enact a mental disability provision, a
court might decide to continue to include mental disabilities under
the coverage of the workers' compensation system. Under this ap-
proach the judiciary would posit its belief that the workers' compen-
sation system, rather than the common-law decisionmaking process,
should resolve cases of work related mental disabilities and the dis-
tributive issues collateral to compensating them. Because the work-
ers' compensation decisionmaking process potentially conflicts with
the essential purpose of the workers' compensation system, this judi-
cial decision would be jurisprudentially problematic. 8'
A court could remedy the questionable jurisprudence underlying
its adherence to the workers' compensation system by expressly rec-
ognizing that the causation standard-regardless whether its roots
are in a threshold inquiry or the arise-out-of employment require-
ment-potentially will frustrate the essential legislative purpose of
the workers' compensation system. The court also should acknowl-
edge the possible under or overinclusive effect of the causation stan-
dard. Moreover, the court should declare forthrightly the policies
that the standard effectuates, and require the parties to argue the
complex and often competing policy ramifications of the proposed
standard. For example, the parties might address projected benefit,
rehabilitative, and employer insurance costs;2 9 administrative costs
in terms of the judicial efficiency in applying a standard; the poten-
tial increase or decrease in the number of claims and appeals; the
relationship between a standard's potential coverage and the poten-
tial coverage for mental disorders under collateral governmental or
private systems;2 40 a standard's deterrent effect on employers to pro-
vide an employment environment conducive and sensitive to mental
policy causation inquiry. They, therefore, would not eliminate the evaluative nature of the cau-
sation inquiry or the shifting of the evaluative decision to the appellate courts through the
finding of fact-question of law distinction.
238. See supra notes 215-18 and accompanying text.
239. See Goldstone & Collins, Concepts of Vocational Rehabilitation, in MENTAL HEALTH
AND WORK ORGANIZATION 251 (A. McLean ed. 1970); Hutchinson, A Look at Rehabilitation, in 2
SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES FOR THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
LAws 397 (1973); Kiser, A Review of Benefit-Cost Analysis in Vocational Rehabilitation, in 2
SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES FOR THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
LAWS 383 (1973).
240. Among the collateral private benefit systems that the court might consider are pri-
vate health and disability plans or collectively bargained health disability programs. See Hen-
derson, supra note 12, at 129-33. The social security system also provides benefits for mental
disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The Social Security Act, however,
includes a complex offset formula for payments made under workers' compensation. See 42
U.S.C. § 424a(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
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health;2 4 1 a standard's impact on the hiring of persons with back-
grounds reflecting mental disorder. 42 Parties also should ask the
court to consider the distributive justice dimensions of the workers'
compensation system.243 In addition, the court should declare ex-
pressly that the standard it adopts is solely an evaluative policy cau-
sation inquiry.2,4 The only factual inquiry is the one that establishes
the time, place, and other circumstances attendant to the injury.245
This step would eliminate the factual causation inquiry-laden with
evaluative underpinnings. In addition, a court should express a judi-
cial deference for the trier's policy causation decision or risk consist-
ently utilizing the principles of appellate review to assert its evalua-
tive decision. The consequential administrative burden on the system
would be enormous.246
241. See Comment, Workmen's Compensation Awards, supra note 2, at 1146-47; Trice &
Roman, supra note 2, at 198-99.
242. See Comment, Workmen's Compensation Awards, supra note 2, at 1145. A court
would have to consider the potential substantive effect of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29
U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (Supp. V 1981) (as amended by Act of Nov. 6, 1978, P.L. 95-602, tit. I, §
122(a)(1), 92 Stat. 2984). For an excellent discussion of the effect of the Rehabilitation Act on
mentally disabled employees, see Spencer, supra note 2, at 669-77.
243. In the context of accidental injury law distributive justice means that the court
should distribute the cost of an injury-and ultimately the wealth of a party-according to
"who a party is." See THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE, bk. V, ch. 4, at 114-15 (Ross
transl. World's Classics ed. 1954); Fletcher, supra note 15, at 547 n.40.
Under the principle of distributive justice, arguably the "imposition of higher rate costs on
the employer could be justified in terms of the humanitarian purposes of shifting the risk, as
between two innocent parties, to the one who can best bear or distribute the cost." Comment,
Workmen's Compensation Awards, supra note 2, at 1143 (footnotes omitted). This argument,
of course, is conceptually interrelated to the enterprise insurance principle. See supra note 233.
A claimant also might argue-as did plaintiffs in Deziel IH-that courts in mental disabil-
ity cases should adopt a causation standard with a potentially overinclusive effect on recovery
to satisfy the commonly accepted rule of statutory construction that the workers' compensation
statutes require liberal construction because of their remedial quality. See Deziel II, 403 Mich.
at 33-35, 268 N.W.2d at 14-15; supra note 187 and accompanying text. The "liberal construc-
tion" principle is grounded in distributive justice considerations. See Henderson, supra note 12,
at 126.
The argument for overinclusiveness has arisen in less elaborate form: "[I]n accord with the
growing liberality of compensation and as a result of increased awareness of the indefinite ori-
gins of industrial injuries, the courts could allow compensation for all psychoneurotic injuries
suffered by an employee for the reason that employment, like every other phase of the workers'
environment, has in some measure contributed to his injury." Comment, Workmen's Compen-
sation Awards, supra note 2, at 1143. For an analysis of the philosophical bases of these argu-
ments, see J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusTIcE ch. V, § 43 (1971).
244. Commentators have recommended a similar conclusion for the causation determina-
tion for cardiovascular disabilities. See Cohen & Klein, A Proposed Solution to the Legal
Problems of Workmen's Compensation Heart Cases, in 1 SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES FOR THE NA-
TIONAL COMMISSION OF STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 179 (1973).
245. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
246. A court also should be aware of the inherent definitional problems that will arise if it
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VII. A PERSPECTIVE
A resolution of the mental disabilities causation issue does not
lie necessarily within existing accident compensation systems. The
systemic complexity of the work related mental disability causation
issue-which extends to causation determination for other disabling
diseases of unknown etiology such as cardiovascular and back related
diseases 247 -may demand a structural solution. 248 Professor John
Burton, former Chairman of the National Commission on State
Workmen's Compensation Laws,249 has recommended a systemic so-
lution in broad outline form. Professor Burton proposes that legisla-
tures enact a system concerned specifically with occupational diseases
of unknown etiology. This system, a "Workers' Disease Protection
Act," would exist collaterally with the workers' compensation system,
and the basic structures of the two systems would be nearly identical.
The workers' disease protection system, however, would contain
neither a policy requiring injuries to be work related nor a factual
causation inquiry. Instead, under the new system, if an employee suf-
fered from a disease of unknown etiology and if the disease disabled
him, the employee would receive compensation comparable to that
which he would receive under a workers' compensation system.250
adopts a different standard for mental disabilities. The problem of distinguishing between a
mental and physical injury will become relevant in determining the applicable causation stan-
dard. For a discussion of this problem, see supra note 233 and accompanying text.
247. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
248. In 1969 Dean Henderson made the last significant critical attempt to present radical
systemic solutions to the problems that the causation issue raises. Henderson, supra note 12;
See Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lottery: Compensation and Selective Reimbursement,
53 VA. L. REv. 774 (1967).
249. Congress created the National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws
in 1970. The President appointed members of the Commission. Pursuant to the enabling legis-
lation that created it, the National Commission published The Report of the National Com-
mission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws (1972), a Compendium (1973), and a volume
of Supplemental Studies (1973).
250. Burton, supra note 12. In his introduction Professor Burton declares:
The halcyon days are gone for workers' compensation and occupational diseases. Less than
a decade ago the National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws issued its
Report that devoted only two pages to the topic of work-related diseases. It is unimagin-
able that a similar report issued in the 1980s could deal with occupational diseases in such
a facile fashion because of three interrelated developments that have occurred in the last
decade: first, a growing awareness that the magnitude of the work-related disease problem
is substantially greater than previously recognized; second, increasing concern about how
the workers' compensation program can deal with occupational diseases; and third, in-
creasing discussion of programs other than workers' compensation that could protect
workers afflicted by occupational diseases.
Id. at 1 (footnotes omitted). After discussing the extent of the occupational disease problem
and the compensation of these diseases by the workers' compensation systems, id. at 2-16, Pro-
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The structural advantage of this system is obvious: it simply
would eliminate the complex, interrelated, and often competing tech-
nical, policy, and systemic problems that the causation issue creates
in cases concerning mental disabilities and disabilities that result
from other diseases of unknown etiology. An immediate structural
objection to this system, however, is equally evident. Employers un-
doubtedly would argue that the absence of a work related causation
formula would increase greatly insurance costs and, consequently,
would heighten the. price of an employer's product (assuming that the
employer vertically could pass the increased cost of insurance into
the stream of commerce). 251 The degree to which a workers' disease
protection system provides an employee's exclusive remedy against
an employer for a disabling disease of unknown etiology and the ex-
tent to which benefits under the system are coordinated with benefits
received from collateral private and governmental services provide an
effective balance against this employer objection. If, after legislative
compromise, the new system becomes the exclusive remedy for dis-
fessor Burton concludes, in agreement with the analysis and critique in this Article, that
[o]ne underlying reason for the inherent limits on reform in workers' compensation is the
multiple causation typical for many diseases. These diseases may result from a mixture of
congenital, degenerative, personal, environmental, and work-related factors. Multiple cau-
sation enormously complicates the decisions concerning where to draw the general line on
the spectrum between compensable and noncompensable diseases and how to make opera-
tionalized [sic] that decision. . . . [T]here are multiple dimensions along which the causes
of diseases can be arrayed. Along one dimension is work-related factors; along another is
hereditary factors; along another degenerative and so on. The complexity of the task of
defining in these multiple dimensions the volume of cases that will be compensable almost
guarantees that the decision will be arbitrary.
Id. at 18. Professor Burton then proposes the "fundamental precepts" of a "Workers' Disease
Protection Act" to resolve the problems that the "multiple causation" dimension of occupa-
tional diseases of unknown etiology creates. The primary underpinnings of this system are,
first, its application "to selected diseases [only] such as cancer, back cases, or heart attacks.
These are the types of diseases where multiple causes are likely and the ability to sort out the
contribution of work-place factors from other causative factors is particularly difficult." Id. at
21. Second, the system would not include a work related test. "The claimant is required to
establish that he was or is an employee and that he has a disease that has caused an impair-
ment that in turn has caused actual loss of earnings." Id. at 21-22.
The inclusion of cancer poses serious problems. An employee's cancer, of course, may result
from exposure to toxic substances in the workplace. See Levy, The Preliminary Handling of
Chemical and Toxic Tort Cases, 26 PRAC. LAW. 43 (1980); McGovern, Toxic Substances Litiga-
tion in the Fourth Circuit, 16 U. RICH. L. REV. 247 (1982); Trauberman, Compensating Victims
of Toxic Substances Pollution: An Analysis of Existing Federal Statutes, 5 HARv. ENVTL. L.
REv. 1 (1981). The causation issue in cases of workplace cancers is substantively different from
the causation issue in mental disease cases. The issues in compensating occupationally related
cancers, therefore, deserve separate analysis. Id. The interrelationship between a compensation
scheme for occupationally related cancer and the workers' disease protection system is a subject
beyond the scope of this Article.
251. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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abled employees against employers, employer and consumer costs
might actually diminish. First, an exclusive system would eliminate
the litigation costs inherent in the difficult proof problems surround-
ing the determination of the causal relationship between a worker's
• employment environment and a disabling disease of unknown etiol-
ogy.2 52 Second, an exclusive system would eliminate the increasingly
imaginative and costly efforts of employees and employers to maxi-
mize their interests by utilizing the inherent employment or nonem-
ployment dimension of a disabling disease or injury of unknown eti-
ology to either "opt out" of the workers' compensation system into
the tort system or "opt in" to the workers' compensation system from
the tort system.253 Third, the cost of the system effectively would di-
minish if it contained-unlike the workers' compensation sys-
tem-comprehensive substantive mechanisms by which to coordinate
benefits with benefits received from collateral sources.254 Last, em-
ployers' costs could decrease if, as Professor Burton proposes, em-
ployee contributions help to finance the system.2 5
252. See supra notes 215-28 and accompanying text. As Professor Burton observes, under
the workers' compensation system diseases of unknown etiology present "so much room for
honest disagreement . . . that the inducements to litigation seem irresistible." Burton, supra
note 12, at 19. Professor Burton does not propose that the workers' disease protection system
be completely exclusive. Instead, he suggests that "workers will be able to obtain workers' com-
pensation benefits for the first six months of disability if they can meet the work-related test in
that program, [a]fter six months, workers' compensation has no further responsibility for the
workers covered by the Workers' Disease Protection Acts." Id. at 22. Moreover, he proposes:
The Workers' Disease Protection benefits would be the exclusive liability of the employer
for claims by its employees for diseases, other than the benefits provided during the first
six months of disability by other programs. Employees would retain the right to sue third
parties for negligence with the exact requirements for recovery to be resolved in later de-
liberations by the National Commission. Any recovery by an employee against a third
party would be reduced by the amount of the Disease Protection benefits. Employers
would have no right to recoup any of the Disease Protection benefits paid to their employ-
ees from the recoveries against third parties. These rules would presumably reduce the
incentives for employers to encourage suits by their employees against third parties and
for employees to file the suits in the first place.
Id. at 25.
253. For a critically probing discussion and analysis of the "opting out," "opting in" issue,
see M. FRANKLIN, INJURIES AND REMEDIES: TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 783-86 (1979).
254. Professor Burton proposes comprehensive coordination of collateral private and gov-
ernmental benefits, including an offset of social security retirement, survivor, and medical bene-
fits, and an offset of medical benefits provided under private plans. Burton, supra note 12, at
22-23.
255. Professor Burton proposes that the system be financed by equal employer and em-
ployee contributions. Id. at 23. He adds that the insurance rates for employers would be experi-
ence rated. Although the purpose of experience rating is to provide an incentive for employers
to reduce the incidence of diseases within the employers' control, Professor Burton argues that
a system which eliminates the causation formula still would maintain incentives for a safe work
environment:
19831 WORKERS' COMPENSATION
A system structured along the line of the workers' disease pro-
tection system deserves serious attention. A primary purpose of this
Article has been to show that mental disabilities and, by analogy,
other disabling diseases of unknown etiology such as cardiovascular
and back related disabilities, place an enormous and increasing pres-
sure not only on the workers' compensation system, but also on the
compensation systems that a worker's compensation inexorably af-
fects. A worker's disease protection system, which structurally re-
forms the present methods of compensating for these disabilities,
provides the kind of solution necessitated by one of the most impor-
tant and visible issues in personal injury law.
An employer could be charged for the benefits paid to his disabled workers, whether or not
the disabling injuries were work related. This would elimiante any disputes over the cause
of the disability. However, if it could be assumed that nonwork-related injuries are distrib-
uted randomly among the working population, the system in effect reduces to a flat-rate
tax on all businesses to finance benefits for off-the-job injuries. Obviously, questions such
as the credibility to be given to each firm's experience would have to be resolved, but this
plan would appear to fulfill the accident prevention and cost allocation objectives of the
workmen's disability income system.
Burton, supra note 12, at n.43, quoting Berkowitz & Burton, The Income-Maintenance Objec-
tive in Workmen's Compensation, 24 INDUS. & LAE. REL. REV. 34, n.20.
Professor Burton also discusses the insurance mechanism for the system:
Employers and carriers [would be] liable for all claims filed within five years after the
policy year. The employers and carriers also [would be] liable for claims filed more than
five years after the policy year expires that are not the responsibility of [a] special fund.
The special Disease Protection Fund [would be] liable for all claims filed more than five
years after the policy year expires as soon as the incurred losses of the carrier exceed the
premiums generated by the pure loss component of the manual rates. The payments from
the special Disease Protection Fund [would be] financed by assessments against all carri-
ers and employers that are proportionate to payroll.
Burton, supra note 12, at 24-25.

